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Ideas for 'works', 'The Consolations of Philosophy' and 'works'

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
5770 Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius]
     Full Idea: If there is no free will, then in vain is reward offered to the good and punishment to the bad, because they have not been deserved by any free and willed movement of the mind.
     From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III)
     A reaction: I just don't see why decisions have to come out of nowhere in order to have any merit. People are different from natural forces, because the former can be persuaded by reasons. A moral agent is a mechanism which decides according to reasons.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
6559 Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1
     A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586!
5764 When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius]
     Full Idea: When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature.
     From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.III)
     A reaction: This is a view I find quite sympathetic, but which is a million miles from the modern view. Today's paper showed a picture of a famous criminal holding a machine gun and a baby. We seem to delight in the idea that human nature is partly wicked.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
5756 Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius]
     Full Idea: Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired.
     From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.I)
     A reaction: This sounds like the ancient 'eudaimonism' of Socrates and Aristotle, which might not be entirely compatible with orthodox Christianity. It is not true, though, that happy people lack ambition. To be happy, an unfilfilled aim may be needed.