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Ideas for 'works', 'Lives of Eminent Philosophers' and 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo'

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
1850 Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: If we are not free to will in any way, but are compelled, everything that makes up ethics vanishes: pondering action, exhorting, commanding, punishing, praising, condemning.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply)
     A reaction: If doesn't require some magical 'free will' to avoid compulsions. All that is needed is freedom to enact your own willing, rather than someone else's.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
6559 Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1
     A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586!
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
1851 Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Good applies to all goals, just as truth applies to all forms mind takes in.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply)
     A reaction: In danger of being tautological, if good is understood as no more than the goal of actions. It seems perfectly possibly to pursue a wicked end, and perhaps feel guilty about it.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
1838 Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28)
     A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus.