Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'Dawn (Daybreak)' and 'works'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


11 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
The very idea of a critique of morality is regarded as immoral! [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Even to think of criticising morality, to consider morality as a problem, as problematic: what? was that not - is that not - immoral?
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], Pref 3)
     A reaction: Offering critiques of the value of morality and of truth are perhaps Nietzsche's greatest achievements.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Morality prevents us from developing better customs [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Morality acts to prevent the rise of new and better mores: it stupefies.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 019)
     A reaction: Note that he wants 'better' customs, and not just different ones. So the deep question concerns the criteria for why some customs are better. He seems to want us to fulfil our natures more completely. Arts, sciences, great deeds...
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1
     A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586!
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The history of moral feeling is completely different from the history of moral concepts. The former are powerful before, the latter especially after an action in view of the compulsion to pronounce upon it.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 034)
     A reaction: I think he places the feelings in our animal origins, and the concepts in rather unnatural cultures.
Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: To trust your feelings - that means obeying your grandfather and your grandmother and their grandparents more than the gods in us: our reason and our experience.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 035)
     A reaction: He says prior to this that feelings are just an inheritance, not our true natures. Stoics said 'live according to nature', by which they meant 'live by reason', because that is our true nature.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Formerly one tried to get a feel for the majesty of human beings by pointing backward toward their divine descent: this has now become a forbidden path. ...So now the path humanity pursues is proof of its majesty. Alas, this too leads nowhere!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 049)
     A reaction: I love the breadth of Nietzsche's vision, both across history, and in the great scheme. He goes on to say that we are no more a 'higher order' than ants and earwigs.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most dying people have probably lost more important things than what they are about to lose [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The act of dying is not as significant as the universal awe of it would have us believe, and the dying person has probably lost more important things in life than he is now about to lose.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 349)
     A reaction: He says this is a thought about death which we tend to repress. It would depend on the life, I should think, but it is probably right in very many cases.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Marriage is too serious to be permitted for people in love! [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Lovers' vows ought to be publicly declared invalid and marriage denied the pair: and indeed precisely because one ought to take marriage unspeakably more seriously!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 151)
     A reaction: Sounds like the traditional aristocratic attitude to marriage, so the idea suits Nietzsche. I think that nowadays it is much wiser to be base proposal of marriage on friendship than on love. You are choosing a life-long friend, not someone to adore.
Marriage upholds the idea that love, though a passion, can endure [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The institution of marriage stubbornly upholds the belief that love, though a passion, is, as such, capable of duration.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 027)
     A reaction: No wonder Nietzsche never married. Women must have been terrified of him, when he came out with this sort of remark. I doubt whether many couples who are celebrating their golden wedding would agree with him. [1/5/2017]
Fear reveals the natures of other people much more clearly than love does [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Fear has furthered the universal knowledge of humanity more than love, for fear wants to discern who the other person is, what he can do and what he wants.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 309)
     A reaction: Nietzsche had it in for love at this stage in his career. This remark strikes me as brilliantly accurate.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Punishment has distorted the pure innocence of the contingency of outcomes [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: With this infamous art of interpreting the concept of punishment, people have robbed of its innocence the whole, pure contingency of events.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 013)
     A reaction: What a wonderfully subtle observation about moral luck! That whole problem is driven by the issue of whether the agent should be punished. When a chain of errors leads to disaster, we may see many innocent people doing a collective evil.