display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
| 20216 | Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Modern ethics generally considers morality much less a system for fulfilling human nature than a set of principles for dealing with individuals in conflict. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 7) | |
| A reaction: Historically I associate this move with Hugo Grotius around 1620. He was a great legalist, and eudaimonist virtue ethics gradually turned into jurisprudence. The Enlightenment sought rules for resolving dilemmas. Liberalism makes fulfilment private. |
| 6559 | Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586! |
| 16763 | We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: We ought to hold, on the contrary, that the soul takes its leave when we die only because this heat ceases and the organs that bring about bodily movement decay. | |
| From: René Descartes (The Passions of the Soul [1649], I.5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5 | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a pretty major change in our concept of death, given that we all now agree with Descartes. |
| 20193 | Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Because of moral luck, the realm of the morally praiseworthy / blameworthy is not indisputably within one's voluntary control or accessible to one's consciousness. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 4.2) | |
| A reaction: [She particularly cites Thomas Nagel for this] It is a fact that we will be blamed (more strongly) when we have moral bad luck, but the question is whether we should be. It seems harsh, but you can't punish someone as if they had had bad luck. |
| 20199 | Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski] |
| Full Idea: Modern moral philosophers have been considerably more skeptical than were the ancient Greeks about the close association between the flourishing of the individual and that of the community. | |
| From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.2) | |
| A reaction: I presume this is not just a change in fashion, but a reflection of how different the two societies are. In a close community with almost no privacy, flourishing individuals are good citizens. In the isolations of modern liberalism they may be irrelevant. |