Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'The Logic of What Might Have Been' and 'On Virtue Ethics'

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
6559 Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1
     A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586!
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
4358 Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse]
     Full Idea: Some critics say virtue is not necessary for eudaimonia (since the wicked sometimes flourish), and others say it is not sufficient (because virtuous behaviour sometimes ruins a life).
     From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.8)
     A reaction: Both criticisms seem wrong (the wicked don't 'flourish', and complete virtue never ruins lives, except in tragic dilemmas). But it is hard to prove them wrong.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
4337 Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse]
     Full Idea: Adolescents tend to be much more gormless about consequences than they are about ideals.
     From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2 n12)
     A reaction: Very accurate, I'm afraid. But this cuts both ways. They seem to need education not in virtue, but simply in consequences.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
4324 Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse]
     Full Idea: The trouble with 'flourishing' as a translation of 'eudaimonia' is that animals and even plants can flourish, but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings.
     From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro)
     A reaction: 'Flourishing' still seems better than 'happy', which is centrally used now to refer to a state of mind, not a situation. 'Well being' seems good, and plants are usually permitted that.