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Ideas for 'works', 'Morality and Art' and 'Ethics and Language'

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
22445 Morality shows murder is wrong, but not what counts as a murder [Foot]
     Full Idea: While one can determine from the concept of morality that there is an objection to murder one cannot determine completely what will count as murder.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.7)
     A reaction: She then refers to abortion, but there are military and criminal problem cases, and killings by neglect or side effect.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
22444 A moral system must deal with the dangers and benefits of life [Foot]
     Full Idea: A moral system seems necessarily to be one aimed at removing particular dangers and securing certain benefits.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.6)
     A reaction: I thoroughly approve of this approach to morality, which anchors it in real life, rather than in ideals or principles of reason.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
6559 Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal [Aristotle, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge (and somewhat to my surprise), Aristotle never actually says that man is a rational animal; however, he all but says it.
     From: report of Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.1
     A reaction: When I read this I thought that this database would prove Fogelin wrong, but it actually supports him, as I can't find it in Aristotle either. Descartes refers to it in Med.Two. In Idea 5133 Aristotle does say that man is a 'social being'. But 22586!
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
23689 Moral words have an inherited power from expressing attitudes in emotional situations [Stevenson,CL]
     Full Idea: A term is moral because of the power that the word acquires, on account of its history in emotional situations, to evoke or directly express attitudes, as distinct from describing or designating them.
     From: Charles Leslie Stevenson (Ethics and Language [1944], p.33), quoted by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 1 'Ayer'
     A reaction: Invites the question of what the words meant before they acquired this patina of historical usage. If 'good' orginally meant 'hurray!', its repeated usage doesn't seem to change that. If it was descriptive, why would that change with time?