|
4125
|
Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
|
|
Full Idea:
In Hare's theory I apply a "role-reversal test", and then acquire an actual agglomeration of preferences that apply to the hypothetical situation. The result is utilitarianism.
|
|
From:
report of Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
|
|
A reaction:
It hits that traditional stumbling block, of why I should care about the preferences of others. Pure reason and empathy are the options (Kant or Hume). I may, however, lack both.
|
|
4126
|
If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
|
|
Full Idea:
Hare's version of utilitarianism requires an agent to abandon any deeply held principle or conviction if a large enough aggregate of contrary preferences, of whatever kind, favours a contrary action.
|
|
From:
comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
|
|
A reaction:
This nicely attacks any impersonal moral theory, whether it is based on reason or preferences. But where did my personal ideals come from?
|
|
4127
|
If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
|
|
Full Idea:
If there is to be total identification with others, then if another's preferences are mistaken, the preferences I imagine myself into are equally mistaken, and if 'identification' is the point, they should remain mistaken.
|
|
From:
comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
|
|
A reaction:
Yes. The core of morality must be judgement. Robots can implement universal utilitarian rules, but they could end up promoting persecutions of minorities.
|
|
22483
|
A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
|
|
Full Idea:
We say something prescriptive if and only if, for some act A, some situation S and some person R, if P were to assent (orally) to what we say, and not, in S, do A, he logically must be assenting insincerely.
|
|
From:
Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981], p.21), quoted by Philippa Foot - Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? p.190
|
|
A reaction:
Foot offers this as Hare's most explicit definition. The use of algebra strikes me as ludicrous. In logic letters have the virtue of not shifting their meaning during an argument, but that is not required here.
|
|
18230
|
No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
If we put together all the things that are ....not done or undergone for their own sake ...no one would choose, in order to have them, to be alive rather than not.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1215), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality'
|
|
A reaction:
Debatable. Roughly his question is whether you would rather be dead than be a slave, since slaves work for means, but have no ends. Aristotle would rather die, but those who surrendered in ancient battles preferred slavery.
|
|
23909
|
Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
There is intrinsic use of a possession, such as of a shoe or a cloak, and its coincidental use - not of course when using a shoe as a weight, but as, for example, selling it or hiring it out (for then a shoe is used as a shoe).
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1231b37)
|
|
A reaction:
This seems to need a third label, for using the shoe as a weight. 'Inessential use' perhaps, since the intrinsic use points towards the essential nature or function of the shoe.
|
|
5870
|
Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is not true that everything that there is seeks some single good: each thing has an inclination for its own good, the eye for sight, the body for health, and so on.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218a30)
|
|
A reaction:
Aristotle's pluralism. Elsewhere this pluralism arises from his function argument - that the good of each thing is the successful fulfilment of its function, which is different for each thing. This is basic to virtue theory, and has my approval.
|
|
5868
|
Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
No horse or bird or fish is happy, nor any other thing that there is which does not have a share by its nature in the divine.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217a26)
|
|
A reaction:
Pet owners will all feel their beloved companions have been insulted, but I agree with this. 'Happy' does not here mean 'in a state of pleasure'. A fully successful bird does little more than the four f's (feed, fornicate, flee, fight).
|
|
5865
|
Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle]
|
|
Full Idea:
To be happy, and to live the fine and divinely-happy life, would seem to reside in three things above all, ..for some say that wisdom is the greatest good, others virtue, others pleasure.
|
|
From:
Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214a30)
|
|
A reaction:
Aristotle is well-known for his pluralist answer to this question: virtue is crucial, wisdom is perhaps the greatest of the virtues, and pleasure improves everything in life.
|