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4 ideas
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: If we are not free to will in any way, but are compelled, everything that makes up ethics vanishes: pondering action, exhorting, commanding, punishing, praising, condemning. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
A reaction: If doesn't require some magical 'free will' to avoid compulsions. All that is needed is freedom to enact your own willing, rather than someone else's. |
15772 | A thing's active function is its end [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: A thing's active function is its end. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1050a16) | |
A reaction: This sort of remark is the basis of modern teleological functionalism about the mind. I think that is misguided. Don't define things by their function. They have functions because of intrinsic character. |
629 | Is the good a purpose, a source of movement, or a pure form? [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The good is a principle for all things, and is so in the very highest degree, but in what way? As a purpose, as a source of movement, or as a form? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1075a32) | |
A reaction: I tend to think of it as an 'ideal', whatever that is, and hence an inspiration, but a rather vague one. Beauty, goodness and truth. Surely not a source of movement? |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
Full Idea: Good applies to all goals, just as truth applies to all forms mind takes in. | |
From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.reply) | |
A reaction: In danger of being tautological, if good is understood as no more than the goal of actions. It seems perfectly possibly to pursue a wicked end, and perhaps feel guilty about it. |