Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works', 'Super Epistolam Pauli Apostoli' and 'Principia Ethica'

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE]
     Full Idea: Good does not, by definition, mean anything that is natural; and it is therefore always an open question whether anything that is natural is good.
     From: G.E. Moore (Principia Ethica [1903], §027)
     A reaction: This is the best known modern argument for Platonist idealised ethics. But maybe there is no end to questioning anywhere, so each theory invites a further question, and nothing is ever fully explained? Next stop - pragmatism.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross]
     Full Idea: Moore describes rightness and beauty as the two main value-attributes, apart from goodness.
     From: report of G.E. Moore (Principia Ethica [1903]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §IV
     A reaction: This was a last-throw of the Platonic ideal, before we plunged into the value-free world of Darwin and the physicists. It is hard to agree with Moore, but also hard to disagree. Why do many people despise or ignore these values?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
     Full Idea: Moore claims that 'right' means 'productive of the greatest possible good'.
     From: report of G.E. Moore (Principia Ethica [1903]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §I
     A reaction: Ross is at pains to keep 'right' and 'good' as quite distinct notions. Some actions are right but very unpleasant, and seem to produce no real good at all.
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
     Full Idea: 'Right' does and can mean nothing but 'cause of a good result', and is thus identical with 'useful', whence it follows that the end always will justify the means.
     From: G.E. Moore (Principia Ethica [1903], §089)
     A reaction: Of course, Moore does not identify utility with pleasure, as his notion of what is good concerns fairly Platonic ideals. Would Stalin's murders have been right if Russia were now the happiest nation on Earth?