Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Consolations of Philosophy', 'Reportatio' and 'Writings from Late Notebooks'

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6 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Morality is a system of values which accompanies a being's life [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: By morality, I understand a system of valuations which is contiguous with a being's conditions of life.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 36[264])
     A reaction: It needs to be added that the values influence and control the life. Note that this defines morality as neither the qualities of character of virtue theory, nor the rules for conduct of deontology and utilitarianism. Morality MUST be rooted in values.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Morality is merely interpretations, which are extra-moral in origin [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: My main proposition: there are no moral phenomena, there is only a moral interpretation of those phenomena. This interpretation itself is of extra-moral origin.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 02[165])
     A reaction: The origin will, of course, be the 'will to power', which is the drive for survival, linking Nietzsche with sociobiology or evolutionary psychology.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius]
     Full Idea: If there is no free will, then in vain is reward offered to the good and punishment to the bad, because they have not been deserved by any free and willed movement of the mind.
     From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.III)
     A reaction: I just don't see why decisions have to come out of nowhere in order to have any merit. People are different from natural forces, because the former can be persuaded by reasons. A moral agent is a mechanism which decides according to reasons.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Values are innate and inherited [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Valuations are innate (despite Locke!), inherited.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 01[21])
     A reaction: This would conform with Charles Taylor's views (e.g. Idea 4002). But how are we sheep ever going to fall in with the values of our Superman when he arrives, if we are stuck with our own innate values?
Our values express an earlier era's conditions for survival and growth [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The feeling of value is always antiquated, it expresses a much earlier era's conditions for survival and growth.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 10[23])
     A reaction: Nice. I myself grew up in the aftermath of the Second World War. Have I ingested values that were created for that era, and are no longer required?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius]
     Full Idea: When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature.
     From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], IV.III)
     A reaction: This is a view I find quite sympathetic, but which is a million miles from the modern view. Today's paper showed a picture of a famous criminal holding a machine gun and a baby. We seem to delight in the idea that human nature is partly wicked.