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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'A Critique of Utilitarianism' and 'Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives'

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6 ideas

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue

5972	Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
	Full Idea: According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d
	A reaction: This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth).

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure

1777	Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures, and nothing disgraceful is good.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.60
	A reaction: I certainly approve of the idea that not all pleasure is intrinsically good. Indeed, I think good has probably got nothing to do with pleasure. 'Disgraceful' is hardly objective though.

5973	Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
	Full Idea: Chrysippus thinks that, while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 23) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1070d
	A reaction: This is an interesting and original contribution to the ancient debate about pleasure. It shows Aristotle's moderate criticism of pleasure (e.g. Idea 84), but attempts to pinpoint where the danger is. Aristotle says it thwarts achievement of the mean.

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism

22408	Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: The emphasis on the necessary comparability of situations is a peculiar feature of consequentialism in general.
	From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2)
	A reaction: A nice point. Utilitarians might achieve comparison by totting up the happiness in each situation, but once you include the consequences of the consequences the problems are obvious. Was 1789 a good thing? Too early to say.

22411	For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B]
	Full Idea: Making the best of a bad job is a consequentialist maxim, and it will have something to say even pn the difference between massacring seven million and massacring seven million and one.
	From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2)
	A reaction: If every life counts, the consequentialists have got something right here. Not caring exactly how many were massacred is a sort of callousness (even when the number can't be established).

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure

20845	There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: Chrysippus (in his On Pleasure) denies even of pleasure that it is a good; for there are also shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good.
	From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.103
	A reaction: Socrates seems to have started this line of the thought, to argue that pleasure is not The Good. Stoics are more puritanical. Nothing counts as good if it is capable of being bad. Thus good pleasures are not good, which sounds odd.