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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Twilight of the Idols' and 'Anti-Semite and Jew'

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22 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Healthy morality is dominated by an instinct for life [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an instinct for life.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.4)
     A reaction: Sounds right. There is no reasoning against a moral nihilist, because they seem to have no instinct in favour of life. It is the given of morality.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Philosophers hate values having an origin, and want values to be self-sufficient [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: For philosophers, the higher must not be allowed to grow out of the lower, must not be allowed to have grown at all ...Moral: everything of the first rank must be causa sui. Origin in something else counts as an objection, as casting a doubt on value.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 2.4)
     A reaction: This is so deep and central that I wrote a paper on it, advocating that the theory of values should focus of value-makers.
There are no moral facts, and moralists believe in realities which do not exist [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: An insight formulated by me: that there are no moral facts whatever. Moral judgement has this in common with religious judgement that it believes in realities which do not exist.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 6.1)
     A reaction: Not only a slogan for non-cognitivism, but also a clear statement of the error theory about morality, a century before John Mackie.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: The order and reason of fate set in motion the general types and starting points of the causes, but each person's own will [or decisions] and the character of his mind govern the impulses of our thoughts and minds and our very actions.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.11
     A reaction: So if you try and fail it was fate, but if you try and succeed it was you?
The doctrine of free will has been invented essentially in order to blame and punish people [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment, that is of finding guilty.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.7)
     A reaction: Michael Frede says free will was invented to feel wholly in charge of our own actions. I doubt whether punishment was the first motive. The will just gives a simple explanation of actions.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: The human being was born for the sake of contemplating and imitating the cosmos.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37
     A reaction: [This seems to be an idea of Chrysippus] Remind me how to imitate the cosmos. Presumably this is living according to nature, but that becomes more obscure when express like this.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Stoics say that justice exists by nature, and not because of any definition or principle.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.66
     A reaction: cf Idea 3024. Stoics thought that nature is intrinsically rational, and therein lies its justice. 'King Lear' enacts this drama about whether nature is just.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: What am I to take as the principle of appropriate action and raw material for virtue if I give up nature and what is according to nature?
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1069e
     A reaction: 'Nature' is awfully vague as a guideline, even when we are told nature is rational. I can only make sense of it as 'human nature', which is more Aristotelian than stoic. 'Go with the flow' and 'lay the cards you are dealt' might capture it.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: The goal of life is to live in agreement, which is according to experience of the things which happen by nature.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.06a
     A reaction: Cleanthes added 'with nature' to Zeno's slogan, and Chyrisppus added this variation. At least it gives you some idea of what the consistent rational principle should be. You still have to assess which aspects of nature should influence us.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life thus even constitutes an objection to him, a question-mark as to his wisdom, a piece of unwisdom.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02)
     A reaction: I take his point to be neither that life is unquestionably valuable nor that it is valueless, but that the very question is ridiculous. If we live, we value living. Sounds right.
The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The value of life cannot be estimated.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02)
     A reaction: Military leaders apparently judge that the death of one of their own soldiers is worth between 12 and 20 enemy deaths (so history suggests). How about ransom money?
When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: When we speak of values we do so under the inspiration and from the perspective of life: life itself evaluates through us when we establish values
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5)
     A reaction: I love Nietzsche's ideas about the source of values, and his remarks about the value of life. Other thinkers sound so simplistic in comparison.
In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: In every age the wisest have passed the identical judgement on life: it is worthless.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.01)
     A reaction: I guess he was having a bad day. Since the whole universe is clearly 'worthless', this judgement must in some sense be correct. But I love my books.
Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Judgements, value judgements concerning life, for or against it, can in the last resort never be true.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02)
     A reaction: I suppose this is in the same spirit as judging whether celery tastes nice. Are you for or against the Moon?
To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: One would have to be situated outside life ....[and yet know it thoroughly] ....to be permitted to touch on the problem of the value of life at all.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5)
     A reaction: Can practising artists question the value of their art? The whole point of objectivity is that we can mentally step 'outside' of something, without actually withdrawing from it.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is the spiritualisation of sensuality [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The spiritualization of sensuality is called 'love': it is a great triumph over Christianity.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.3)
     A reaction: I'm not quite clear what 'spiritualization' means, particularly when it comes from Nietzsche.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d
     A reaction: This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth).
A good human will be virtuous because they are happy [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: A well-constituted human being, a 'happy one', must perform certain actions and shrink from other actions. In a formula: his virtue is the consequence of his happiness.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 5.2)
     A reaction: A nice reversal of basic Aristotle, though Aristotle does say that the truly virtuous person is happy in their actions. Treat unhappy people with caution!
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures, and nothing disgraceful is good.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.60
     A reaction: I certainly approve of the idea that not all pleasure is intrinsically good. Indeed, I think good has probably got nothing to do with pleasure. 'Disgraceful' is hardly objective though.
Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus thinks that, while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 23) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1070d
     A reaction: This is an interesting and original contribution to the ancient debate about pleasure. It shows Aristotle's moderate criticism of pleasure (e.g. Idea 84), but attempts to pinpoint where the danger is. Aristotle says it thwarts achievement of the mean.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Only the English actually strive after happiness [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Man does not strive after happiness; only the Englishman does that.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], Maxim 12)
     A reaction: The Danes keeping being voted the happiest nation, so presumably that results from some sort of effort on their part. The easiest is happiness is to achieve security, then do nothing.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus (in his On Pleasure) denies even of pleasure that it is a good; for there are also shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.103
     A reaction: Socrates seems to have started this line of the thought, to argue that pleasure is not The Good. Stoics are more puritanical. Nothing counts as good if it is capable of being bad. Thus good pleasures are not good, which sounds odd.