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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Human, All Too Human' and 'Action'

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10 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Nietzsche challenged belief in free will, on the ground that will itself …is non-existent. The will is in truth nothing but a complex of sensations, as of power and resistance, and it is illusion to think of it as a basis for 'moral responsibility'.
     From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107) by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche's Immoralism p.153
     A reaction: Modern neuroscience seems to support Nietzsche on this, though I will continue to use the concept of 'will' in philosophy, to mean the main brain events which normally combine in decision-making. That makes the will a process, not a entity.
Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: The order and reason of fate set in motion the general types and starting points of the causes, but each person's own will [or decisions] and the character of his mind govern the impulses of our thoughts and minds and our very actions.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 7.2.11
     A reaction: So if you try and fail it was fate, but if you try and succeed it was you?
The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The history of moral feelings is the history of an error, an error called 'responsibility', which in turn rests on an error called 'freedom of the will'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 039)
     A reaction: I totally agree with this, though I think the term 'responsible' is useful in ethics, though only in the sense that the lightning was responsible for the thunder. Nietzsche appears to have anticipated Mackie's error theory about morality.
Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Man's complete lack of responsibility, for his behaviour and for his nature, is the bitterest drop which the man of knowledge must swallow, if he had been in the habit of seeing responsibility and duty as humanity's claim to nobility.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107)
     A reaction: If you were seeing humanity as little transient angels, living a moral life that was an echo of God's, then you needed cutting down to size. But if you ask if there is anything 'noble' in the universe, it will still be the fine deeds of humanity.
It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Man may no longer praise, no longer blame, for it is nonsensical to praise and blame nature and necessity. Just as he loves a work of art (or a plant) but does not praise it, because it can do nothing about itself, so he must regard human actions.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107)
     A reaction: But humans can 'do something about themselves'. They can read the works of Nietzsche. He overestimates the importance of the loss of free will, when we grasp that there is no such thing.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: One must have a good memory to be able to keep the promises one has given. One must have strong powers of imagination to be able to have pity. So closely is morality bound to the quality of the intellect.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 059)
     A reaction: Nice to see him say that strong powers of imagination are an 'intellectual' quality, which I think is not properly understood by the more geeky sort of intellectual.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: The human being was born for the sake of contemplating and imitating the cosmos.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by M. Tullius Cicero - On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') 2.37
     A reaction: [This seems to be an idea of Chrysippus] Remind me how to imitate the cosmos. Presumably this is living according to nature, but that becomes more obscure when express like this.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: In the soul of the original ruling clans and castes, the man who has the power to requite goodness with goodness, evil with evil, and really does practice requital by being grateful and vengeful, is called 'good'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 045)
     A reaction: The idea that evil should indeed repay evil was very much a feature of goodness until the philosophers came in on the act. In those days no one else had any power, so they had no scope for goodness.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Stoics say that justice exists by nature, and not because of any definition or principle.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.1.66
     A reaction: cf Idea 3024. Stoics thought that nature is intrinsically rational, and therein lies its justice. 'King Lear' enacts this drama about whether nature is just.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: What am I to take as the principle of appropriate action and raw material for virtue if I give up nature and what is according to nature?
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - On Common Conceptions 1069e
     A reaction: 'Nature' is awfully vague as a guideline, even when we are told nature is rational. I can only make sense of it as 'human nature', which is more Aristotelian than stoic. 'Go with the flow' and 'lay the cards you are dealt' might capture it.