Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Scientific Image' and 'Virtues of the Mind'

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6 ideas

22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
5972 Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: According to Chrysippus, living happily consists solely in living virtuously.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr139) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1060d
     A reaction: This, along with 'live according to nature', is the essential doctrine of stoicism. This is 'eudaimonia', not the modern idea of feeling nice. Is it possible to admire another person for anything other than virtue? (Yes! Looks, brains, strength, wealth).
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
1777 Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures, and nothing disgraceful is good.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.60
     A reaction: I certainly approve of the idea that not all pleasure is intrinsically good. Indeed, I think good has probably got nothing to do with pleasure. 'Disgraceful' is hardly objective though.
5973 Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus thinks that, while justice could not be preserved if one should set up pleasure as the goal, it could be if one should take pleasure to be not a goal but simply a good.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 23) by Plutarch - 72: Against Stoics on common Conceptions 1070d
     A reaction: This is an interesting and original contribution to the ancient debate about pleasure. It shows Aristotle's moderate criticism of pleasure (e.g. Idea 84), but attempts to pinpoint where the danger is. Aristotle says it thwarts achievement of the mean.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
20193 Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Because of moral luck, the realm of the morally praiseworthy / blameworthy is not indisputably within one's voluntary control or accessible to one's consciousness.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], I 4.2)
     A reaction: [She particularly cites Thomas Nagel for this] It is a fact that we will be blamed (more strongly) when we have moral bad luck, but the question is whether we should be. It seems harsh, but you can't punish someone as if they had had bad luck.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
20199 Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Modern moral philosophers have been considerably more skeptical than were the ancient Greeks about the close association between the flourishing of the individual and that of the community.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 2.2)
     A reaction: I presume this is not just a change in fashion, but a reflection of how different the two societies are. In a close community with almost no privacy, flourishing individuals are good citizens. In the isolations of modern liberalism they may be irrelevant.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
20845 There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus (in his On Pleasure) denies even of pleasure that it is a good; for there are also shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.103
     A reaction: Socrates seems to have started this line of the thought, to argue that pleasure is not The Good. Stoics are more puritanical. Nothing counts as good if it is capable of being bad. Thus good pleasures are not good, which sounds odd.