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Ideas for 'The Sayings of Confucius', 'Principles of Philosophy of the Future' and 'Human, All Too Human'

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14 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Nietzsche said the will doesn't exist, so it can't ground moral responsibility [Nietzsche, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Nietzsche challenged belief in free will, on the ground that will itself …is non-existent. The will is in truth nothing but a complex of sensations, as of power and resistance, and it is illusion to think of it as a basis for 'moral responsibility'.
     From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107) by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche's Immoralism p.153
     A reaction: Modern neuroscience seems to support Nietzsche on this, though I will continue to use the concept of 'will' in philosophy, to mean the main brain events which normally combine in decision-making. That makes the will a process, not a entity.
The history of morality rests on an error called 'responsibility', which rests on an error called 'free will' [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The history of moral feelings is the history of an error, an error called 'responsibility', which in turn rests on an error called 'freedom of the will'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 039)
     A reaction: I totally agree with this, though I think the term 'responsible' is useful in ethics, though only in the sense that the lightning was responsible for the thunder. Nietzsche appears to have anticipated Mackie's error theory about morality.
Ceasing to believe in human responsibility is bitter, if you had based the nobility of humanity on it [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Man's complete lack of responsibility, for his behaviour and for his nature, is the bitterest drop which the man of knowledge must swallow, if he had been in the habit of seeing responsibility and duty as humanity's claim to nobility.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107)
     A reaction: If you were seeing humanity as little transient angels, living a moral life that was an echo of God's, then you needed cutting down to size. But if you ask if there is anything 'noble' in the universe, it will still be the fine deeds of humanity.
It is absurd to blame nature and necessity; we should no more praise actions than we praise plants or artworks [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Man may no longer praise, no longer blame, for it is nonsensical to praise and blame nature and necessity. Just as he loves a work of art (or a plant) but does not praise it, because it can do nothing about itself, so he must regard human actions.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 107)
     A reaction: But humans can 'do something about themselves'. They can read the works of Nietzsche. He overestimates the importance of the loss of free will, when we grasp that there is no such thing.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
All men prefer outward appearance to true excellence [Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: I have yet to meet a man as fond of excellence as he is of outward appearances.
     From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], IX.18)
     A reaction: Interestingly, this cynical view of the love of virtue is put by Plato into the mouths of Glaucon and Adeimantus (in Bk II of 'Republic', e.g. Idea 12), and not into the mouth of Socrates, who goes on to defend the possibility of true virtue.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Intellect is tied to morality, because it requires good memory and powerful imagination [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: One must have a good memory to be able to keep the promises one has given. One must have strong powers of imagination to be able to have pity. So closely is morality bound to the quality of the intellect.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 059)
     A reaction: Nice to see him say that strong powers of imagination are an 'intellectual' quality, which I think is not properly understood by the more geeky sort of intellectual.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Plotinus was ashamed to have a body [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: Plotinus, according to his biographers, was ashamed to have a body.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Principles of Philosophy of the Future [1843], §29)
     A reaction: When Feuerbach draws our attention to this, we see what an astonishing state it is for a human being to have got into. Modern thought is appalled by it, but it also has something heroic about it, like swimming all the time because you want to be a fish.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Humans are similar, but social conventions drive us apart (sages and idiots being the exceptions) [Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: In our natures we approximate one another; habits put us further and further apart. The only ones who do not change are sages and idiots.
     From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XVII.2)
     A reaction: I find most of Confucius rather uninteresting, but this is a splendid remark about the influence of social conventions on human nature. Sages can achieve universal morality if they rise above social convention, and seek the true virtues of human nature.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Originally it was the rulers who requited good for good and evil for evil who were called 'good' [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: In the soul of the original ruling clans and castes, the man who has the power to requite goodness with goodness, evil with evil, and really does practice requital by being grateful and vengeful, is called 'good'.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 045)
     A reaction: The idea that evil should indeed repay evil was very much a feature of goodness until the philosophers came in on the act. In those days no one else had any power, so they had no scope for goodness.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
No one has ever done anything that was entirely for other people [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Never has a man done anything that was only for others and without any personal motivation. …How could the ego act without ego?
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 133)
     A reaction: This is only a denial of the purest of 'pure' altruism. It is hard to imagine anyone performing an altruistic action which permanently shamed the reputationof its performer - though it might be possible in a nicely contrived fiction.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Simultaneous love and respect are impossible; love has no separation or rank, but respect admits power [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: It is impossible to be loved and respected by the same person. For the man who respects another acknowledges his power; his condition is one of awe. But love acknowledges no power, nothing that separates, differentiates, ranks higher or subordinates.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 603)
     A reaction: Depends what you mean by 'respect', but this looks like nonsense. Do we 'respect' someone because they point a gun at us? I would say love and respect are inseparable.
If you love nothing, it doesn't matter whether something exists or not [Feuerbach]
     Full Idea: To him who loves nothing it is all the same whether something does or does not exist.
     From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Principles of Philosophy of the Future [1843], §33)
     A reaction: This seems to me to be quite a good motto for the aim of education - just get them to love something, no matter what (well, almost!). Loving something, even if it is train-spotting, seems a good route to human happiness.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
We get enormous pleasure from tales of noble actions [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: How much pleasure we get from morality! Just think what a river of agreeable tears has flowed at tales of noble, generous actions.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 091)
     A reaction: How can anyone not adore Nietzsche? The pleasure of a noble deed is the most piercing and the deepest pleasure known to us. It isn't 'just' a pleasure.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We can only achieve happy moments, not happy eras [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The destiny of men is designed for happy moments (every life has those), but not for happy eras.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 471)
     A reaction: The vicissitudes of life (my favourite word!) are such that even the most serene and well-adjusted person is going to be perturbed on several days of the week, even if only by the unhappiness of the people around them.