Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'fragments/reports' and 'On Second-Order Logic'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


6 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
It was Epicurus who made the question of the will's freedom central to ethics [Epicurus, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Epicurus was responsible for the innovatory recognition that the question of the will's freedom is central to ethics.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3
     A reaction: Compare Ideas 7672 and 6018. Obviously ethical action needs freedom, but the idea of a 'free will' is quite different. It is a fiction, created to give some sort of arrogant ultimate responsibility to our actions, like God.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / h. Fine deeds
Fine things are worthless if they give no pleasure [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: I spit on the fine and those who emptily admire it, when it doesn't make any pleasure.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.16
     A reaction: in Athenaeus
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Pleasure is the chief good, because all animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and offended by pain by their natural instinct, without the employment of reason.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29
     A reaction: The highest pleasure of predators is likely to be the killing of weaker animals. What all animals do isn't much of a criterion for the natural chief good. They also breathe.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The pains of the soul are worst, for the flesh is only sensible of present affliction, but the soul feels the past, present and future.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29
     A reaction: I don't think feeling extended across time is very relevant. What matters is that pains of the soul usually endure far longer than physical suffering.
Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: If every pleasure lasted long, and affected the whole body, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.08
     A reaction: This seems to miss out on intensity, which is of great importance to most pleasure seekers. Also it is a pleasure to be alive, which is lifelong, but we barely notice it.
The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas]
     Full Idea: Epicurus identifies our final end with what he calls tranquillity or 'ataraxia', which is static pleasure.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.7
     A reaction: I don't recall any Greek ever spotting that boredom is a problem. But then they didn't have privacy, so other people always hold their attention. Maybe this is a dream of privacy.