Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Beyond Good and Evil' and 'The Discourses'

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15 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The most boring and dangerous of all errors is Plato's invention of pure spirit and goodness [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The worst, most wearisomely protracted and most dangerous of all errors hitherto has been a dogmatist's error, namely Plato's invention of pure spirit and the good in itself.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref)
     A reaction: A landmark observation about the history of philosophy. Imagine if all the Aristotle had survived, but all the Plato had been lost.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Nietzsche felt that Plato's views downgraded the human body and its brevity of life [Nietzsche, by Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Nietzsche believed that by elevating the importance of the mind, Plato downplayed the wonders of the body, and by searching for a timeless Truth he degraded the indisputable fact of human temporality.
     From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], Pref) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason Prol. X
     A reaction: Both ideas are very important. The second is widely misunderstood. Nietzsche was not a denier of truth. He asked us to scrutinise the role and value we assign to truth.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: We have these two elements mingled within us, a body in common with the animals, and reason and intelligence in common with the gods.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.03.03)
     A reaction: This is what I call Human Exceptionalism, but note that it doesn't invoke a Christian soul or spiritual aspect. This separation of reason goes back at least to Plato. High time we stopped thinking this way. Animals behave very sensibly.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: In every species nature produces some exceptional being, in oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. We do not say to them 'Who are you?' It will tell you 'I am like the purple in the robe. Do not expect me to be like the rest, or find fault with my nature'.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 3.01.23)
     A reaction: This idea began with Aristotle's 'great soul', and presumably culminates in Nietzsche, who fills in more detail. In the modern world such people are mostly nothing but trouble.
Noble people see themselves as the determiners of values [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The noble type of man feels himself to be the determiner of values.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §260)
     A reaction: So do criminals
Nietzsche's judgement of actions by psychology instead of outcome was poisonous [Foot on Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Nietzsche wants to judge actions not by what is done, but by the nature of the person who does them, and that is poisonous. We have to be horrified by what is done by Hitler and Stalin, without inquiring into their psychology.
     From: comment on Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886]) by Philippa Foot - Interview with Philippa Foot p.37
     A reaction: She says morality should focus on social needs, not on spontaneity, energy and passion. Nietzsche was very much a product of romanticism. Some of Nietzsche's heroes are military conquerors, so I think she is right.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: That which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §153)
     A reaction: He is referring to the conventional morality of his contemporary society. Nietzsche clearly thought that actions motivated by love are intrinsically good. (Apart from murders by the jealous!).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Nature is totally indifferent, so you should try to be different from it, not live by it [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: You Stoics want to "live according to nature"? Oh you noble Stoics, what fraudulent words! Nature is prodigal and indifferent beyond measure - how could you live by such indifference? Living is wanting to be other than nature.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §009)
     A reaction: I think this is simply indicative of the slide from optimism to pessimism about nature in the intervening centuries. Stoics thought nature rational. See 'King Lear' for the transition.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: When the time comes, then I will die - as becomes a person who gives back what is not his own.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.32)
     A reaction: There is a tension between his demand that he have full control of his choices, and this humility that says his actual life is not his own. The things which can't be controlled, though, are 'indifferents' so life and death are indifferent.
Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: It is not pain or death that is to be feared, but the fear of pain or death.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.01.13)
     A reaction: These two cases are quite different, I would say. I'm much more frightened of pain than I am of the fear of pain, and the opposite view seems absurd. About death, though, I think this is right. Mostly I'm with Spinoza: think about life, not death.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Whoever has knowledge of good things would know how to love them; and how could he who cannot distinguish good things from evil still have to power to love? It follows that the wise man alone has the power to love.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.22.03)
     A reaction: A rather heartwarming remark, but hard to assess for its truth. Evil people are unable to love? Not even love a cat, or their favourite car? We would never call someone wise if they lacked love.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Where is the paradox if we say that what is evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature?
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.01.125)
     A reaction: A very Greek view. For humans, it must rely on the belief that human nature is essentially good. If I am sometimes grumpy and annoying, why is that not part of my nature?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: The essence of the good is a certain disposition of our choice, and essence of evil likewise.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.29.01)
     A reaction: This is the origin of Kant's famous view, that the only true good is a good will. This is the alternative to good character or good states of affairs as the good. It points towards the modern more legalistic view of morality, as concerning actions.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Designation of moral values was everywhere first applied to human beings, and only later and derivatively to actions.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §260)
     A reaction: Nietzsche was a great expert on ethics in the ancient world, so you should trust him on this one. In ordinary life assessment of people is what counts. Actions are for law courts.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
In the earliest phase of human history only consequences mattered [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Throughout the longest part of history ('prehistoric times') the value or non-value of an action was derived from its consequences. …but now men are unanimous that the value of an action is in the intention behind it.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §032)
     A reaction: This seems to be Kant's fault. No one thinks that a reckless or malicios action is innocent if no actual harm results.