display all the ideas for this combination of texts
15 ideas
21872 | We seek our own advantage, and virtue is doing this rationally [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Acting absolutely from virtue is nothing else in us but acting, living, and preserving our being (these three signify the same thing) by the guidance of reason, from the foundation of seeking one's own advantage. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 24) | |
A reaction: The influence of stoicism is obvious here, that we live according to our nature, but our nature is rational. Spinoza doesn't seem to understand the pure altruism of lovers and parents. |
21873 | Men only agree in nature if they are guided by reason [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Only insofar as men live according to the guidance of reason, must they always agree in nature. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 35) | |
A reaction: A nice expression of the guiding idea of the Enlightenment - that consensus is the defining characteristic of rationality. Spinoza's politics emerges from this idea. |
8019 | Along with his pantheism, Spinoza equates ethics with the study of human nature [Spinoza, by MacIntyre] |
Full Idea: The counterpart of understanding God as identical with Nature is understanding ethics as the study not of divine precepts but of our own nature and of what necessarily moves us. | |
From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.10 | |
A reaction: As stated here, this seems wrong. We should approach ethics through Aristotle, but not through Freud. That is, virtues can be inferred from human nature, but the actual facts of human nature may be grubby and unpalatable. |
17229 | If infancy in humans was very rare, we would consider it a pitiful natural defect [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: If a number of human beings were born adult, and only a few here and there were born infants, everyone would pity the infants, because we should then consider infancy not as a thing natural and necessary, but as a defect or fault of nature. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], V Pr 06) | |
A reaction: A lovely example of the new objectivity about human beings that emerged in the Enlightenment. He could have said the same about old age. |
17189 | The essence of man is modifications of the nature of God [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: The essence of man consists of certain modifications of the attributes of God. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], II Pr 10) | |
A reaction: Not an idea you hear much these days! |
17207 | By 'good' I mean what brings us ever closer to our model of human nature [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: By 'good' I understand everything which we are certain is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature we set before us. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pref) | |
A reaction: Unusual, and I'm not sure I understand it. His ideal largely concerns the intellect ruling the emotion |
4845 | We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: In no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], III Pr 09) | |
A reaction: Shocking, coming from a leading rationalist philosopher. It sounds more like Hume. Surely rationalism should put our capacity for judgement centre-stage? But Spinoza was a determinist. Is Kantian freedom of judgement required? Deterministic judgement? |
17217 | Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Love is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 44) | |
A reaction: This doesn't seem to quite capture the pain that some people find in love. |
4848 | Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], III Pr 13) | |
A reaction: Not a definition to give us inspirational guidance! Sounds like grumpy old Hobbes. This is the 'love' of a heroin addict for a syringe. Personally I see love as having a rational aspect, which puts it 'under the aspect of eternity' (as Spinoza said!). |
7833 | Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M] |
Full Idea: Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value. | |
From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.10 | |
A reaction: This looks like a very seventeenth century view. There was a steady move from cynicism through to the optimism of the eighteenth century. I just don't agree that self-interest is the "sole" source of value, though we should never underestimate it. |
17224 | If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: If the human mind had none but adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 64) | |
A reaction: There is some sort of notion of the wholly rational and benign community here, where living well is the single communal thought. It's sort of true. Good people don't even think about wickedness. |
21870 | Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: One and the same thing can, at the same time, be good and bad, and also indifferent. For example, music is good for one who is melancholy, bad for one who is mourning, and neither good nor bad to one who is deaf. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pref) | |
A reaction: This sounds neat and obvious, but both the mourner and the deaf person might well acknowledge that music is a good thing, while failing to appreciate it at the time. I accept that a concert was good, even if I didn't attend it. |
4860 | Man's highest happiness consists of perfecting his understanding, or reason [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: In life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding, or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness consists. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IVApp 04) | |
A reaction: I fear that only a highly intelligent person like Spinoza would suggest this. The genius of Jesus is to say that if you don't have a powerful intellect you can still be happy by having a pure and loving heart. The Spinoza route is better, if possible. |
4847 | Pleasure is a passive state in which the mind increases in perfection [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: By pleasure I shall signify a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], III Pr 11) | |
A reaction: A rather bizarre definition! He seems to be defining it as a state and as a process in the same sentence. It sounds to me like both a hedonist's charter, and nonsense. I'm with Plato and Aristotle, that pleasure is dangerous as it warps the mind. |
4859 | Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action [Spinoza] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is only bad in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action. | |
From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 59) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the incipient epicureanism found in enlightenment figures who are drifting towards atheism (of which his contemporaries accused Spinoza). Sadism? Grief is good pain. I'm too happy to be cruel. |