display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Agents who perform evil nonautonomously do not know what they are doing, because they have made a mistake in understanding or evaluating their own conduct. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.4) | |
A reaction: So while liberals say that true evil must be autonomous, Kekes says it may result from factual or evaluative error, for which people are also responsible. |
23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Ought implies can translates into the claim that only autonomous agents are morally responsible. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Since Kekes identifies autonomy as the key to liberalism, he sees this also as a basic liberal claim (which he rejects). I ought to ring my mother, but my phone is broken (so I ought not to ring my mother?).. |
23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Why should moral responsibility be made to depend on autonomy, rather than on intelligence, education, social role, experience, or whatever? | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Social role seems a particularly good one to cite. 'I didn't really understand what I was doing.' 'But it's your job to understand!' |
23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Moral and causal responsibility cannot be distinguished as clearly as the liberal strategy requires. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.2) | |
A reaction: I take assessment to be a two-stage operation. It is usually easy to assign causal responsibility. Moral responsibiity is quite different. Our negligence can make us morally responsible for an event we didn’t cause. |
23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If one main task of morality is to prevent evil, then morality must be concerned with all evil-producing actions, not just autonomous ones. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Hm. Is placing a railing next to a flight of steps a moral action? Possibly. |
23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
Full Idea: If much evil is due to nonautonomous actions, then liberals cannot be right in idenitfying the domain of moral responsibility with the domain of autonomy. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.1) | |
A reaction: One might evade this anti-liberal thought by making responsibility directly proportional to degree of autonomy. Then the only counterexample would be genuine immorality that is entirely non-autonomous, but is there such a thing? |
23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Psychological states are relevant to the degree of an agent's moral responsibility, while the effects of their actions are relevant to whether the agents are liable to moral responsibility. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 03.5) | |
A reaction: He has previously offered a problem case for this, where someone's social role makes them fully responsible whatever their mental state. I still think his distinction is helpful. 1) Whose fault is it, then 2) How far are they to blame? Normal practice. |
23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The view of human nature at the core of the liberal faith is that human beings are by their nature free, equal, rational, and morally good. | |
From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.5) | |
A reaction: These four claims are quite distinct, and should be evaluated separately. I think I'm something of a liberal, but I don't really accept any of them. Hm. I just want all people to have these attributes. |