Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Tragedy of Reason', 'Of liberty, Fate and God's grace' and 'Eudemian Ethics'

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8 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
22512 Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Whatever a man does - not in ignorance, and through his own agency - when it is in his power not to do it, must be voluntary, and that is what voluntary is.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1225b08)
     A reaction: This is the conclusion of the Eudemian discussion of responsibility. This is a definition by necessary and sufficient conditions. How can you be sure that something is in your power not to do?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
22509 What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: By these marks we distinguish what comes naturally: everything that is there straightaway as soon as something comes to be, and all that occurs to us if growth is allowed to proceed normally - such as greying hair, ageing, and the like.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1224b32)
     A reaction: The word 'normal' has to do a lot of work here. Presumably jaundice in a neonate is not included. Or later hereditary diseases.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18230 No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If we put together all the things that are ....not done or undergone for their own sake ...no one would choose, in order to have them, to be alive rather than not.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1215), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality'
     A reaction: Debatable. Roughly his question is whether you would rather be dead than be a slave, since slaves work for means, but have no ends. Aristotle would rather die, but those who surrendered in ancient battles preferred slavery.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
23909 Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There is intrinsic use of a possession, such as of a shoe or a cloak, and its coincidental use - not of course when using a shoe as a weight, but as, for example, selling it or hiring it out (for then a shoe is used as a shoe).
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1231b37)
     A reaction: This seems to need a third label, for using the shoe as a weight. 'Inessential use' perhaps, since the intrinsic use points towards the essential nature or function of the shoe.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
5870 Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is not true that everything that there is seeks some single good: each thing has an inclination for its own good, the eye for sight, the body for health, and so on.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1218a30)
     A reaction: Aristotle's pluralism. Elsewhere this pluralism arises from his function argument - that the good of each thing is the successful fulfilment of its function, which is different for each thing. This is basic to virtue theory, and has my approval.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
5877 We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is because it is not easy to discern what sort of choice it is that we are forced to judge from the deeds what sort of person someone is; the activity is more worth having, but the choice is commended more.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1228a15)
     A reaction: This shows why Aristotle is the most important opponent of consequentialism. It is hard to see how one could praise a self-interested deed simply because it benefited others. Greed is never good.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
5868 Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: No horse or bird or fish is happy, nor any other thing that there is which does not have a share by its nature in the divine.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217a26)
     A reaction: Pet owners will all feel their beloved companions have been insulted, but I agree with this. 'Happy' does not here mean 'in a state of pleasure'. A fully successful bird does little more than the four f's (feed, fornicate, flee, fight).
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
5865 Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: To be happy, and to live the fine and divinely-happy life, would seem to reside in three things above all, ..for some say that wisdom is the greatest good, others virtue, others pleasure.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1214a30)
     A reaction: Aristotle is well-known for his pluralist answer to this question: virtue is crucial, wisdom is perhaps the greatest of the virtues, and pleasure improves everything in life.