Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Locke on Human Understanding', 'The Upanishads' and 'Language,Truth and Logic'

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer]
     Full Idea: Unless it is possible to provide some criterion by which one may decide between conflicting intuitions, a mere appeal to intuition is worthless as a test of a proposition's validity.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.6)
     A reaction: It is a bit much to expect a 'proof' of its 'validity'! If moral judgements are reflected in consequences, then reliable intuitions (i.e. wisdom) could be demonstrated by getting it right (for happiness, or flourishing).
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M]
     Full Idea: Ayer defends emotivism, which is his own favoured form of expressivism.
     From: report of A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.6) by Michael Smith - The Moral Problem 2.1
     A reaction: A helpful distinction of terminology. Expressivism is the broad theory, and emotivism is a sub-type, saying that it is emotions which are expressed. The alternative (such as Prescriptivism) is to express pro- and con- attitudes.
To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer]
     Full Idea: In adding 'You acted wrongly in…' to 'you stole my money' I am not making any further statement about it; I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it.
     From: A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936], Ch.6)
     A reaction: A basic claim of emotivism. Perhaps an understandable response to (e.g.) Kantian claims that we have duties, but to no one in particular. Most people mean by moral criticism that there will be long-term bad consequences, or virtue is lacking.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
The wise prefer good to pleasure; the foolish are drawn to pleasure by desire [Anon (Upan)]
     Full Idea: The wise prefer the good to the pleasant; the foolish, driven by fleshly desires, prefer the pleasant ot the good.
     From: Anon (Upan) (The Upanishads [c.950 BCE], 'Katha')
     A reaction: If you consider appropriate diet, this is too obvious to be worth saying. The complication is that it is doubtful whether a life without pleasure is wholly good, and even the pleasure of food is not bad. Of two good foods, prefer the pleasant one.