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Ideas for 'The Discourses', 'Two Concepts of Liberty' and 'Aspects of the Theory of Syntax'

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: It is not pain or death that is to be feared, but the fear of pain or death.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.01.13)
     A reaction: These two cases are quite different, I would say. I'm much more frightened of pain than I am of the fear of pain, and the opposite view seems absurd. About death, though, I think this is right. Mostly I'm with Spinoza: think about life, not death.
I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: When the time comes, then I will die - as becomes a person who gives back what is not his own.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.01.32)
     A reaction: There is a tension between his demand that he have full control of his choices, and this humility that says his actual life is not his own. The things which can't be controlled, though, are 'indifferents' so life and death are indifferent.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Whoever has knowledge of good things would know how to love them; and how could he who cannot distinguish good things from evil still have to power to love? It follows that the wise man alone has the power to love.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.22.03)
     A reaction: A rather heartwarming remark, but hard to assess for its truth. Evil people are unable to love? Not even love a cat, or their favourite car? We would never call someone wise if they lacked love.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Where is the paradox if we say that what is evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature?
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.01.125)
     A reaction: A very Greek view. For humans, it must rely on the belief that human nature is essentially good. If I am sometimes grumpy and annoying, why is that not part of my nature?