Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On boundary numbers and domains of sets', 'Interview with Philippa Foot' and 'The Scientific Image'

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6 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
     Full Idea: We describe defects in human beings in the same way as we do defects in plants and animals. …You cannot talk about a river as being defective.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: This is a much clearer commitment to naturalistic ethics than I have found in her more academic writings. My opinion of Foot (which was already high) went up when I read this interview. …She says vice is a defect of the will.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
     Full Idea: There are concepts which apply only to living things, considered in their own right, which would include function, welfare, flourishing, interests and the good of something.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: This is a very Aristotelian view, with which I entirely agree. The central concept is function.
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
     Full Idea: A plant needs strong roots in the same way human beings need courage.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: I'm not quite convince by the analogy, but I strongly agree with her basic approach.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
     Full Idea: If you say 'an owl should be able to see in the dark' …you're not going to think that there's a gap between facts and evaluation.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: I take this to be a major and fundamental idea, which pinpoints the failure of Humeans to understand the world correctly. There is always total nihilism, of course, but that is a sort of blindness to how things are. Demanding 'proof' of values is crazy.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
     Full Idea: I don't believe in ultimate principles that must be simply affirmed or denied, but rather in an appeal to the necessities of human life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.37)
     A reaction: I agree. Humans have a strong tendency to elevate anything which they consider important into an absolute (such as the value of life, or freedom).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
     Full Idea: You lose the sense of 'should' if you go on saying 'why should I?' when you've finished the argument about what is rational to do, what you've got reason to do.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], P.34)
     A reaction: Some people reify the concept of duty, so that they do what is required without caring about the reason. I suppose that would wither if they were shown that no reason exists.