display all the ideas for this combination of texts
20 ideas
19738 | Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Our system of values should be understood, among other things, as our attempt to cope with contingencies by making the connection between our well-being and actions less contingent and more within our control. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: He gives an account in which every aspect of morality focuses on human well-being. Of course, the values will dictate what constitutes that well-being, as well as good means of attaining it. |
20145 | Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Values are ...an attempt to cope with contingencies by making the connection between our well-being and actions less contingent and more within our control. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], Intro) | |
A reaction: This sounds more like principles than values, since the former tell you what to do, but a value in itself is just a picture of possibilities. |
23688 | Noncognitivism tries to avoid both naturalism and mysterious morality [Hacker-Wright] |
Full Idea: Noncognitivism is an attempt to avoid the alleged problems of naturalism without the mysteries of Moore's non-naturalism. | |
From: John Hacker-Wright (Philippa Foot's Moral Thought [2013], 1) | |
A reaction: R.M. Hare is the best example of this approach. Moore's Open Question argument was said to prove the Naturalistic Fallacy, which imagined that morality could be a feature of nature. It led Moore to platonism. I prefer Philippa Foot. |
20170 | Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Full responsibility is when evil-doers can fully foresee the harm that results, their victims have not provoked it, it violates the requirements of physical protection in a society, the action reflects character, and it is viciously motivated. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 07.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The point of this is to omit any reference to an explicit intention to perform an evil act. The Nazi Franz Stangl claimed that he never intended evil, but Kekes says that if true he is innocent, but the above definition makes him guilty. |
20165 | Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes] |
Full Idea: A central assumption of Western moral thought is mistaken: the requirements of reason and morality do not coincide. Immorality need not be unreasonable. ...Malevolent motives in combination with ideologies supply reasons for doing evil. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 06.5) | |
A reaction: I presume that Kant would say the malevolent motives are irrational. If I perform an evil act because someone gives me a stupid reason for doing it, I am not thereby rational because I am acting for a reason. Wrong. |
20171 | Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The assumption that the requirements of reason are universal and impersonal ...is false of practical reason that aims at successful action. Whether a belief is true depends on the facts. Whether an action is successful depends on what success consists in. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 08.5) | |
A reaction: Kekes is trying to eliminate the Kantian idea that reason can lead us to the 'right' thing to do. He rightly points to the complex demands of human, cultural and personal values. |
20175 | If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The absurdity follows [from Kant's categorical imperative] that in the case of moral conflicts reason and morality require us to act irrationally and immorally. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 10.4) | |
A reaction: We can't pick one from two equals if we must have a reason for the preference, but that does not make it 'irrational' to choose one of them, when it doesn't matter which one is chosen. Taking one of the cheese sandwiches is not irrational. |
20174 | Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes] |
Full Idea: We must distinguish between pluralism and relativism about values. Pluralists accept that the validity of cultural and personal values is relative to societies and individuals. But they also hold that human values are objectively valid. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 09.4) | |
A reaction: This is a very attractive response to global moral relativism. I see a problem in the neat division into three distinct forms of value. Each of the three sets of values ought to be sensitive to the other two areas. Humans are cultured individuals. |
20158 | Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes] |
Full Idea: There is an irreducible plurality of values that follow from the universal requirements of human well-being, from a shared cultural identity, and from individual conceptions of well-being. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 05 Intro) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very helpful division. It seems reasonably obvious, but I have not encountered it elsewhere. It is an obvious foundation for international negotiations. We can criticise another culture by appealing to human values. |
20159 | Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes] |
Full Idea: I distinguish four types of cultural values likely to be found in a particular society: interpretations of human values; forms of expression and conduct; institutions and practices within them; and modes of evaluation. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 05.2) | |
A reaction: He proceeds to enlarge on these four. This sub-divides the second of his three main areas of value. I like philosophers who do that sort of thing. It gives you the reassuring feeling that you can break a problem down into elements we understand.... |
20161 | The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The major problem for the human dimension of values is the prevalence of evil; for the cultural dimension it is widespread disenchantment; and for the personal dimension it is pervasive boredom. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 05.5) | |
A reaction: Boldly simple claims, but quite persuasive. Presumably it is the evil in human beings, rather than natural evil (like earthquakes) that is the problem. Disenchantment must come through alienation from social values. Powerlessness, rather than boredom? |
20156 | We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes] |
Full Idea: We inevitably feel regret for the many values we could have, but did not, try to realize. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 04.5) | |
A reaction: He's obviously talking about working harder at our projects. |
20150 | There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes] |
Full Idea: A significant feature of our system of values is that it provides many more values than we could pursue. ...We encounter values as possibilities, and we must accept or reject them. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.1) | |
A reaction: This immediately invites the lovely question of what values you are going to invoke when you discriminate among the values available in your culture. Nietzsche says it comes down to 'taste'. |
20151 | Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes] |
Full Idea: The beliefs, emotions, motives, and desires that form our attitudes ...include not only what possibilities we value, but also the limits we should not transgress. ...The strongest limit is what I call 'the unthinkable'. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.2) | |
A reaction: Another chance to link to my favourite idea from Democritus! Ideally we want a theory which shows how a vision of the possibilities immediately points to the limits, and to what is unthinkable. |
20152 | Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Unconditional commitments are the most basic convictions we have. They tell us what we must not do no matter what, what we regard as outrageous, horrible, beyond the pale, or, in religious language, as sacrilegious. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.3) | |
A reaction: The Aztecs should have made rather different unconditional commitments from the ones they ended up with. How do you persuade someone to make such an unconditional commitment. Abortion seems to involve huge clashes here. |
20153 | Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Doing the unthinkable causes deep, often irreparable, damage to our sense of ourselves. ...That is why the unthinkable indicates a more basic commitment than what we have to any value. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.3) | |
A reaction: Kekes makes the interesting claim that what is unthinkable is so basic that it doesn't even count as a value - it is more like a fact of your own nature, which is prior to your values. Not sure about that. |
20162 | Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Four inadequate explanations of human evil attribute it to natural causes, moral monsters, uncharacteristic actions, and corrupting social conditions. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 06.3) | |
A reaction: He is addressing the 'secular problem of evil', which arises if you assume that human beings are essentially good, and then look around you. He says evil explains corrupting social conditions, so we can't be circular about it. |
20154 | Control is the key to well-being [Kekes] |
Full Idea: Increasing control is the key to our well-being. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 04 Intro) | |
A reaction: This slogan emerges from a sustained discussion. Hitler and Stalin increased control rather impressively, so we obviously need a bit more than this to get proper well-being. There's also something to be said for going with the flow. |
5655 | Happiness is not satisfaction of desires, but fulfilment of values [Bradley, by Scruton] |
Full Idea: For Bradley, the happiness of the individual is not to be understood in terms of his desires and needs, but rather in terms of his values - which is to say, in terms of those of his desires which he incorporates into his self. | |
From: report of F.H. Bradley (Ethical Studies [1876]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.16 | |
A reaction: Good. Bentham will reduce the values to a further set of desires, so that a value is a complex (second-level?) desire. I prefer to think of values as judgements, but I like Scruton's phrase of 'incorporating into his self'. Kant take note (Idea 1452). |
20157 | Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes] |
Full Idea: A reasonable conception of well-being requires mistake-free attitudes and well-ordered commitments to some values selected from our society's system of values. | |
From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 05 Intro) | |
A reaction: This summarises where he has got to so far. |