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Ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'From Metaphysics to Ethics' and 'Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy'

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5 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory

6997	Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
	Full Idea: Moral functionalism is the view that the meanings of moral terms are given by their place in the network of input, internal clauses, and output that makes up folk psychology.
	From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5)
	A reaction: Jackson considers this enough to support a cognitivist view of morality. In assuming that there is something stable called 'folk morality' he seems to be ignoring questions about cultural relativism.

7000	Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
	Full Idea: 'Centralists' (e.g. Bernard Williams) say thin ethical concepts (right, good, ought) are conceptually fundamental; 'non-centralists' (e.g. Susan Hurley) say that such concepts are not conceptually prior to kindness, equity and the like.
	From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.5)
	A reaction: My immediate intuition is to side with Susan Hurley, since morality grows out of immediate relationships, not out of intellectual principles and theoretical generalisations. This would go with particularist views of virtue theory.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism

2864	The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn]
	Full Idea: Critics say that intuitionism in ethics explains nothing, but may merely function as a disguise for prejudice or passion.
	From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.198)
	A reaction: If someone claims to have an important moral intuition about something, you should carefully assess the person who has the intuition. I would trust some people a lot.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism

2865	Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn]
	Full Idea: Critics of prescriptivism have noted the problem that whilst accepting a command seems tantamount to setting oneself to obey it, accepting an ethical verdict is, unfortunately, consistent with refusing to be bound by it.
	From: Simon Blackburn (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [1994], p.300)
	A reaction: We nearly all of us accept that our behaviour should be better than it actually is, so we accept the oughts but fail to act. Actually 'refusing', though, sounds a bit contradictory.

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death

16764	The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
	Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
	From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
	A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.