Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Commentary on 'De Anima'', 'Philosophical Remarks' and 'Against Liberalism'

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The soul conserves the body, as we see by its dissolution when the soul leaves [Toletus]
     Full Idea: Every accident of a living thing, as well as all its organs and temperaments and its dispositions are conserved by the soul. We see this from experience, since when that soul recedes, all these dissolve and become corrupted.
     From: Franciscus Toletus (Commentary on 'De Anima' [1572], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.5
     A reaction: A nice example of observing a phenemonon, but not being able to observe the dependence relation the right way round. Compare Descartes in Idea 16763.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
     Full Idea: Love is personal and partial. It is not love if it does not discriminate in favor of its object.
     From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.4)
     A reaction: I agree with that, mainly on the grounds that this is the natural form of human love. Generalised love of mankind seems like a distortion, even if it is well-meaning.
Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
     Full Idea: Love is sentimental if it exaggerates the virtues and minimises the vices of its object.
     From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 09.5)
     A reaction: Not sure about this. It implies that we should retain a streak of cold evaluative objectivity, even about the people we love most. There is difference between knowing a person's qualities, and the importance we attach to those qualities. Forgive vices!
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
     Full Idea: There is no more reason to think of evil as deviation from the good than there is to think of the good as deviation from evil.
     From: John Kekes (Against Liberalism [1997], 02.2)
     A reaction: This is a political moderate right winger defending the concept of evil as a basic and inescapable component of existence, in contrast to liberals who tend to deny 'pure evil'.