Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Social Contract (tr Cress)', 'Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics' and 'Questions on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics'

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3 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without freedom of will actions lack moral significance [Rousseau]
     Full Idea: If you take away all freedom of the will, you strip a man's actions of all moral significance.
     From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (The Social Contract (tr Cress) [1762], I.4)
     A reaction: Rousseau is (in the context) guilty of the basic error of confusing freedom of action with freedom of the will. If the will has scope to act, it has freedom of action; if the will is not contrained in its decision by prior causes, it has freedom of will.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover]
     Full Idea: A mistake of consequentialists is to treat actions as though they can somehow be isolated from the people performing them.
     From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five)
     A reaction: I agree. The weather produces consequences. Morality is about people. Crocodiles, for example, are exempt.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover]
     Full Idea: Forming the intention to use nuclear retaliation if attacked may both be the best way to avoid the catastrophe of nuclear war and at the same time be morally corrupting.
     From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five)
     A reaction: A famous moment in 2017 when Jeremy Corbyn refused to say he would be willing to use the weapons, if elected. It would be hard to sustain a determination to do it, and then reject it at the crucial moment.