Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Being and Time', 'The Ethics' and 'Leviathan'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


8 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger]
     Full Idea: We do not throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something is encountered as such, the thing in question has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world.
     From: Martin Heidegger (Being and Time [1927], p.190-1), quoted by George Dickie - The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude 3 'Undoing'
     A reaction: Analytic philosophy and science have tried to dismantle experience, and Heidegger wants to put it back together. I would say there is a big difference between encountering a thing (which is a bit facty), and understanding it (which is more valuey).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
We don't want things because they are good; we judge things to be good because we want them [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: In no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], III Pr 09)
     A reaction: Shocking, coming from a leading rationalist philosopher. It sounds more like Hume. Surely rationalism should put our capacity for judgement centre-stage? But Spinoza was a determinist. Is Kantian freedom of judgement required? Deterministic judgement?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Desire and love are the same, but in the desire the object is absent, and in love it is present [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Desire and love are the same thing, save that by desire we always signify the absence of the object, by love most commonly the presence of the same.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06)
     A reaction: Implausible reductivism from Hobbes. Plenty of counterexamples to this. You work it out!
Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: Love is nothing else but pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], III Pr 13)
     A reaction: Not a definition to give us inspirational guidance! Sounds like grumpy old Hobbes. This is the 'love' of a heroin addict for a syringe. Personally I see love as having a rational aspect, which puts it 'under the aspect of eternity' (as Spinoza said!).
Love is joy with an external cause [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: Love is joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 44)
     A reaction: This doesn't seem to quite capture the pain that some people find in love.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
All voluntary acts aim at some good for the doer [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.14)
     A reaction: Nonsense. You can only describe sacrificial acts for loved ones, such as children, in this way if this proposal is a tautology. Hobbes cannot know the truth of this claim.
Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value [Spinoza, by Stewart,M]
     Full Idea: Spinoza names self-interest as the sole source of value.
     From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by Matthew Stewart - The Courtier and the Heretic Ch.10
     A reaction: This looks like a very seventeenth century view. There was a steady move from cynicism through to the optimism of the eighteenth century. I just don't agree that self-interest is the "sole" source of value, though we should never underestimate it.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
If our ideas were wholly adequate, we would have no concept of evil [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: If the human mind had none but adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 64)
     A reaction: There is some sort of notion of the wholly rational and benign community here, where living well is the single communal thought. It's sort of true. Good people don't even think about wickedness.