Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Foundations of Geometry' and 'The View from Nowhere'

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
     Full Idea: A purely objective view has no way of knowing whether anything has any value, but actually its data include the appearance of value to individuals with particular perspectives, including oneself.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.2)
     A reaction: I would have thought that a very objective assessment of someone's health is an obvious revelation of value, irrespective of anyone's particular perspective.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel]
     Full Idea: We do not regard the period before we were born in the same way that we regard the prospect of death.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], XI.3)
     A reaction: This is a challenge to Epicurus, who said death is no worse than pre-birth. This idea may be true of the situation immediately post-death, but a thousand years from now it is hard to distinguish them.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel]
     Full Idea: If no one's life has any meaning in itself, how can it acquire meaning through devotion to the meaningless lives of others?
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], XI.2)
     A reaction: This is one of the paradoxes of compassion. The other is that the virtue requires other people to be in need of help, which can't be a desirable situation.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The objective badness of pain is not some mysterious further property that all pains have, but just the fact that there is reason for anyone capable of viewing the world objectively to want it to stop.
     From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], VIII.2)
     A reaction: Presumably all pains (e.g. of grief and of toothache) have something in common, to qualify as pains. It must be more than being disliked, because we can dislike a food.