Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Elements of the Philosophy of Right' and 'On the Source of Necessity'

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3 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Conscience is the right of the self to know what is right and obligatory, and thus make them true [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Conscience is the expression of the absolute title of subjective self-consciousness to know in itself and from within itself what is right and obligatory, to recognise only what it knows as good, and that what is thus known is right and obligatory.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 137), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 08 'The Problem'
     A reaction: [compressed] This is the sort of rabbit-out-of-the-hat move that Hegel loves, and I find implausible. Mill made the key point about conscience.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is ethical life in its natural form [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Love is a feeling, that is, ethical life in its natural form.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 158 add)
     A reaction: For Hegel the less natural forms are more abstract - such as the categorical imperative. Does this imply that intellectual beings should extend the feeling of love into more abstract forms, such as virtues or principles or ideals?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Geach puts 'good' in the class of attributive adjectives, such as 'large' and 'small', contrasting such adjectives with 'predicative' adjectives such as 'red'.
     From: report of Peter Geach (Good and Evil [1956]) by Philippa Foot - Natural Goodness Intro
     A reaction: [In Analysis 17, and 'Theories of Ethics' ed Foot] Thus any object can simply be red, but something can only be large or small 'for a rat' or 'for a car'. Hence nothing is just good, but always a good so-and-so. This is Aristotelian, and Foot loves it.