Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit' and 'Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives'

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5 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism

22392	Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
	Full Idea: There is a sense in which morality is inescapable - in moral epithets such as 'dishonest', 'unjust', 'uncharitable'; these do not cease to apply to a man because he is indifferent to the ends of morality: they may indeed apply because of his indifference.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.172 n15)
	A reaction: Odysseus was admired for lying, and charity wasn't a virtue in the ancient world. They won't go away as factual descriptions, but the values attached to them vary quite a lot.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics

23685	Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
	Full Idea: In her middle period she changed her mind, and attacks moral rationalism.
	From: report of Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
	A reaction: That is, she doubted whether moral reasons are sufficient to motivate moral actions, which presumably therefore need desires, as the Humeans claimed. Reasons rely on merely hypothetical rules.

23691	Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
	Full Idea: The man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency.
	From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.161)
	A reaction: This is 'middle period' Foot, when she decided that Hume was right about the need for a desire as moral motivator. Before and after this time, she thought there were reasons to be moral, as well as desires.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism

6237	Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury]
	Full Idea: Conscience is to find horribly offensive the reflection of any unjust action or behaviour; to have awe and terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply conscience; …thus religious conscience supposes moral or natural conscience.
	From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.II.I)
	A reaction: The reply from religion would be that the Deity has implanted natural conscience in each creature, though this seems to deny our freedom of moral judgment. Personally I am inclined to think that values are just observations of the world - such as health.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism

6234	If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
	Full Idea: If a creature wanting reason has many good qualities and affections, it is certain that if you give this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of gratitude, kindness and pity.
	From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], I.III.III)
	A reaction: A wonderful denunciation of the authority of reason, which must have influenced David Hume. I think, though, that the inverse of this case must be considered (if suddenly given feelings, they would fall in line with reasoning). We reason about feelings.