Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Natural Goodness', 'Moral Beliefs' and 'Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility'

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8 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral norms are objective, connected to facts about human goods [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her early work she defends the objectivity of moral norms, demonstrating their essential connection to facts about what is good for human beings.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: I don't think she ever gave up this idea, which strikes me as thoroughly Aristotelian. The issue is how to understand what is good for us.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality gives everyone reasons to act, irrespective of their desires [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her early work she also defends moral rationalism, which is the idea that morality gives reasons for action to everyone, even those who lack the desire to do what is right.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: Evidently a rejection of the Humean view that only a desire can motivate action, including moral action. There is an ongoing debate about whether reasons can cause anything, or motivate anything. I think the contents of reasons pull us towards action.
We all have reason to cultivate the virtues, even when we lack the desire [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: Foot advocates the view that anyone has reason to cultivate the virtues, even if they lack the desire to do so at a given moment.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], Pt II) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 2 'Concepts'
     A reaction: The view which she soon abandoned, but then returned to later. It specifically repudiates the view of Hume, that only desires can motivate. I'm unsure, because the concept of 'reason' strikes me as too imprecise. She sees self-interest as a reason.
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her late period she again reverses her thoughts on moral rationalism; …rather than a neutral rationality which fulfils desires, she argues that morality ought to be thought of as part of the standard of rationality itself.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: This comes much closer to the Greek and Aristotelian concept of logos. They saw morality as inseparable from our judgements about how the world is. All 'sensible' thinking will involve what is good for humanity.
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
     Full Idea: Different considerations are on a par, in that judgement about what is required by practical rationality must take account of their interaction: of the weight of the ones we call non-moral as well as those we call moral.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1)
     A reaction: Her final settled view of rationalism in morality, it seems. The point is that moral considerations are not paramount, because she sees possible justifications for ignoring moral rules (like 'don't lie') in certain practical situations.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
     Full Idea: In her later work she offers a view of the relationship of morality to human nature, arguing that the moral virtues are part of what makes us good as human beings.
     From: report of Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001]) by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought Intro
     A reaction: In this phase she talks explicitly of the Aristotelian idea that successful function is the grounding of what is good for any living being, including humans.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
     Full Idea: Lack of capacity to reproduce is a defect in a human being. But choice of childlessness and even celibacy is not thereby shown to be defective choice, because human good is not the same as plant or animal good.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 3)
     A reaction: Is failure to reproduce a defect in an animal? If goodness and virtue derive from function, it is hard to see how deliberate childlessness could be a human good, even if it is not a defect. Choosing to terminate a hereditary defect seems good.
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
     Full Idea: Virtues play a necessary part in the life of human beings as do stings in the life of a bee.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 2)
     A reaction: This presumably rests on the Aristotelian idea that humans are essentially social (as opposed to solitary humans who choose to be social, perhaps in a contractual way, as Plato implies).