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Ideas for 'poems', 'Morality, Action, and Outcome' and 'Moral Relativism'

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3 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
     Full Idea: There is a great deal that all men have in common; all need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble.
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.33)
     A reaction: There seem to be some people who don't need affection or a place in a community, though it is hard to imagine them being happy. These kind of facts are the basis for any sensible cognitivist view of ethics. They are basic to Foot's view.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Nomos is king [Pindar]
     Full Idea: Nomos is king.
     From: Pindar (poems [c.478 BCE], S 169), quoted by Thomas Nagel - The Philosophical Culture
     A reaction: This seems to be the earliest recorded shot in the nomos-physis wars (the debate among sophists about moral relativism). It sounds as if it carries the full relativist burden - that all that matters is what has been locally decreed.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
     Full Idea: Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
     A reaction: Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.