Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value' and 'Morality and Art'

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3 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Saying something 'just is' right or wrong creates an illusion of fact and objectivity [Foot]
     Full Idea: When we say that something 'just is' right or wrong we want to give the impression of some kind of fact or authority standing behind our words, ...maintaining the trappings of objectivity though the substance is not there.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality and Art [1972], p.9)
     A reaction: Foot favours the idea that such a claim must depend on reasons, and that the reasons arise out of actual living. She's right.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: If what is final is whatever is an end but never a means, ...why should something be more valuable just because it is useless?
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Finality')
     A reaction: Korsgaard is offering this as a bad reading of what Aristotle intends.
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: If you can only know what is intrinsically valuable through intuition (as Moore claims), you can still argue about what is unconditionally valuable. There must be something unconditionally valuable because there must be a source of value.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Three')
     A reaction: If you only grasped the values through intuition, does that give you enough information to infer the dependence relations between values?