display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
| 22382 | We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Examine wilful murder and see if you can find the matter of fact called vice. You only find certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no matter of fact in the case. You can never find it till you turn your reflexion into your own breast. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], III.I.2), quoted by Philippa Foot - Hume on Moral Judgement p.77 | |
| A reaction: [...In you breast you find 'disapprobation'] The question Foot asks is whether the facts of the case are relevant to the disapprobation. If they are not, as Hume implies, then it would be rational to feel the same disapprobation about drinking coffee. |
| 4008 | Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C] |
| Full Idea: From our modern perspective, the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and moral insight lies irrecoverably shattered by the rise of natural science. | |
| From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §3.2 | |
| A reaction: Modern attempts to challenge Hume's separation of fact from value have failed, but a return to the Greek perspective presents a plausible alternative. |
| 8067 | The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume] |
| Full Idea: Hume's objection to passing from 'is' to 'ought' would equally apply to passing from 'is' to 'owes' or from 'is' to 'needs'. | |
| From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by G.E.M. Anscombe - Modern Moral Philosophy p.176 | |
| A reaction: Profound and important. The empirical and emotivist (nay, nihilist) clinging to the total independence of duties from facts crumbles when looking at facts of human nature or of social groups. Creatures ought to feed; societies ought to flourish. |
| 4578 | You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume] |
| Full Idea: In many writers I find that instead of the usual propositions 'is' and 'is not', I then find no proposition that is not connected with an 'ought' or an 'ought not'. It is necessary that a reason be given for how one can be a deduction from the other. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], III.1.1) | |
| A reaction: A huge claim, the basis of the value-free modern scientific world view. Possible escapes are Greek virtue theory, or Kantian principles, or some sort of a priori values (as in Charles Taylor). |
| 18239 | What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: Kant objects that the world must have a final purpose in order to be worth contemplating, so contemplation cannot be that final purpose. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Judgement II: Teleological [1790]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Arist and' | |
| A reaction: That is a very good objection. If we contemplate the ordered heavens, the ordering of the heavens seems to have a greater value than our contemplation of them. The reply is that the contemplation is the final purpose being contemplated! |
| 18238 | Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose [Kant] |
| Full Idea: A good will is that whereby alone [man's] being can have an absolute worth and in reference to which the being of the world can have a final purpose. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Judgement II: Teleological [1790], C3 443), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Kant' | |
| A reaction: I wish Kant gave a better account of what a 'good' will consists of. This is an awful burden to bear when you are making decisions. |
| 3650 | Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume] |
| Full Idea: It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], II.III.ii) | |
| A reaction: A famous idea, and the embodiment of moral nihilism. I say nothing could ever refute someone who held such a view. No moral theory can force someone to care, if they just don't. |