display all the ideas for this combination of texts
16 ideas
| 4370 | For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: In my view, 'good' for Aristotle means 'telos', and value is real, but relational. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics Intro | |
| A reaction: Interesting. Hence Aristotle is pursuing a naturalist project in ethics, since he connects purpose to function, which is natural and self-evident. |
| 18227 | We desire final things just for themselves, and not for the sake of something else [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1097a30), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality' | |
| A reaction: This is such a simple and neat test for dividing what you value into two groups. You end up with things like art, philosophy, gardening, sipping wine, looking at beautiful views, talking to friends. |
| 4381 | How can an action be intrinsically good if it is a means to 'eudaimonia'? [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A question for Aristotle is, how can an action be good in itself if it is valued as a means to 'eudaimonia'? | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1101a15) by J.L. Ackrill - Aristotle on Action p.93 | |
| A reaction: A good question, but one which shouldn't trouble Aristotle. There is no short cut to eudaimonia (e.g. a pill); it is a state of accumulated good actions. |
| 33 | Each named function has a distinctive excellence attached to it [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: An individual distinctive excellence is attached to the name of the function (e.g. a good 'harpist'). | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098a09) | |
| A reaction: This is the core idea of Aristotle's metaethics. It seems hard to deny that a function implies the values of success and failure. The debate is likely to focus on the exact meaning of 'distinctive'. |
| 5154 | Excess and deficiency are bad for virtue, just as they are for bodily health [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Excessive and insufficient exercise or food destroy one's strength or health, whereas the right quantity produces, increases and preserves them. It is the same with temperance, courage and the other virtues. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a15) | |
| A reaction: An example of Aristotle's philosophy originating in his biological background. This appears to be true of health, but he notes exceptions in morality. Adultery has no mean. In health a middle way is needed, but in morality it is what is 'appropriate'. |
| 5268 | Disreputable pleasures are only pleasant to persons with diseased perception [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One may argue that disreputable pleasures are not pleasant; they may be pleasant to persons of unhealthy disposition, just as things may seem sweet or bitter or white to persons with unhealthy taste or vision. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173b20) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's analogy gives quite good support for what seems a rather implausible view. Bentham disagrees. It certainly seems odd to deny that a sadist is obtaining pleasure. Surely that is what we object to? Is pleasure a value? |
| 5229 | The more virtuous and happy a person is, the worse the prospect becomes of ending life [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The more completely a man possesses virtue, and the happier he is, the more he will be distressed at the thought of death, for to such a man life is supremely worth living. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1117b11) | |
| A reaction: Virtuous people are also, of course, brave. There is a horrible logic which says that you try to be less happy as death becomes more probable. Maybe happy people should pretend they are immortal. |
| 90 | All altruism is an extension of self-love [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: All friendly feelings for others are extensions of a man's feelings for himself. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1168b06) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure what his evidence is for this. The love of parents for their children doesn't seem to be based on self-love. |
| 5263 | Most people want to be loved rather than to love, because they desire honour [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Most people seem to want to be loved rather than to love, the reason being their desire for honour. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1159a13) | |
| A reaction: The footnote says 'honour' here is 'esteem'. In other words, wanting to be loved is a type of vanity, which sounds right. Most people would like being loved from afar, by a person who could do nothing to benefit or please them. |
| 5262 | Only lovable things are loved, and they must be good, or pleasant, or useful [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is generally accepted that not everything is loved, but only what is lovable; and that this is either good, or pleasant, or useful. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1155b16) | |
| A reaction: It needs the great analyst himself to explain to us the ingredients of love. He, of course, goes on to say that good things are the most lovable. It is hard to disagree. |
| 2689 | Good people enjoy virtuous action, just as musicians enjoy beautiful melodies [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The good man, qua good, takes pleasure in morally virtuous actions and dislikes vicious ones, just as a musician enjoys beautiful melodies and is pained by bad ones. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1170a09) | |
| A reaction: This is the best illustration of the Greek love of 'fine' [kalon] actions. 'That was a beautiful thing you just did'. |
| 101 | Slaves can't be happy, because they lack freedom [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nobody attributes happiness to a slave, unless he also attributes to him a life of his own. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1177a08) | |
| A reaction: Give them freedom then! In 'Politics' he allows a degree of friendship between masters and slaves, and recognises that not all slaves are stupid. |
| 5142 | Oxen, horses and children cannot be happy, because they cannot perform fine deeds [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We do not speak of an ox or a horse as happy, because none of them can take part in fine deeds; similarly, no child is happy, because its age debars it as yet from such activities. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1099b32) | |
| A reaction: This is a place where 'happy' is not a very good translation for 'eudaimon', as we universally acknowledge a 'happy childhood'. We can have a 'successful' life, but not a successful childhood. I'm not convinced that even Greeks understood 'eudaimonia'. |
| 5243 | The best people exercise their virtue towards others, rather than to themselves [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The best person is not the one who exercises his virtue towards himself but the one who exercises it towards another, because this is a difficult task. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1130a07) | |
| A reaction: This is an importance counterbalance to the view that Greeks are concerned with self-development, and we are concerned with altruism. Above all, Aristotle wants us to be good citizens, and this implies a great deal of altruism. |
| 92 | Self-love benefits ourselves, and also helps others [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is right for the good man to be self-loving, because then he will both be benefited himself by performing fine actions, and also help others. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1169a12) | |
| A reaction: This is the simple and correct defence of self-love. If everyone develops their own character and abilities, we all benefit. Selfishness is the excess, not the mean. |
| 3559 | For Aristotle, true self-love is love of the higher parts of one's soul [Aristotle, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle thinks that those who think self-love is bad are identifying the self with the lower, irrational parts of the soul. | |
| From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 12.1 | |
| A reaction: That seems to imply love of (and developmen of) one's intellect, but surely the less bookish person can develop their social virtues in a self-loving way? |