Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Interview with Philippa Foot' and 'Disquisitions'

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3 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
     Full Idea: If you say 'an owl should be able to see in the dark' …you're not going to think that there's a gap between facts and evaluation.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.33)
     A reaction: I take this to be a major and fundamental idea, which pinpoints the failure of Humeans to understand the world correctly. There is always total nihilism, of course, but that is a sort of blindness to how things are. Demanding 'proof' of values is crazy.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
     Full Idea: I don't believe in ultimate principles that must be simply affirmed or denied, but rather in an appeal to the necessities of human life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.37)
     A reaction: I agree. Humans have a strong tendency to elevate anything which they consider important into an absolute (such as the value of life, or freedom).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
     Full Idea: You lose the sense of 'should' if you go on saying 'why should I?' when you've finished the argument about what is rational to do, what you've got reason to do.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], P.34)
     A reaction: Some people reify the concept of duty, so that they do what is required without caring about the reason. I suppose that would wither if they were shown that no reason exists.