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5921
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We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
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Full Idea:
While it can be intelligently asked whether the pleasant or beautiful has value, it cannot be intelligently asked whether the good has value, since the good is just to be valuable.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV)
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A reaction:
It is simply tautological that goodness has value, and that valuable things are good. But an assassin might 'value' a 'good' way of killing someone, or an instrument of torture. We might say "He values x, but x is bad". Still, he must think x is good.
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5932
|
The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
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Full Idea:
Four things seem to be intrinsically good - virtue, pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V)
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A reaction:
I greatly admire a philosopher who has the courage to assert such a thing, in the face of centuries of scepticism about anyone's ability to even get started in this area. We need the bold assertions first; we can work back to doubts later, if necessary.
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5910
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The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
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Full Idea:
There are three main things which are intrinsically good - virtue, knowledge, and with certain limitations, pleasure.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II)
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A reaction:
This combines the views of most of the main schools of ancient Greece. For Socrates, knowledge delivers the others; for Aristippus, pleasure eclipses the others; for Zeno of Citium, virtue is all that matters. Ross is a pluralist, like Aristotle.
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5899
|
If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
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Full Idea:
If it is our duty to produce one or other of two or more different states of affairs, without its being our duty to produce one rather than the another, then in such a case each of these acts will be right, and none will be our duty.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I)
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A reaction:
An elegant piece of analytical philosophy, which shows fairly conclusively that 'right' is distinct from 'duty', as well as being distinct from 'good'. We can generalise about right actions, without identifying anyone who has the duty to perform them.
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5938
|
Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
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Full Idea:
The acquisition of pleasure for oneself rarely, if ever, presents itself as a duty, while the attainment of moral goodness habitually presents itself as a duty; this surely points to an infinity superiority of virtue over pleasure.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI)
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A reaction:
You have to be a fully paid-up intuitionist (like Ross) before you can assert such gloriously confident judgements about duty. Personal pleasure could become a duty if you had mistakenly denied it to yourself for a long time.
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5931
|
All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
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Full Idea:
Can anyone doubt that it would be a better state of the universe if, with equality in respect of virtue and of pleasure, and of the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, the persons in the universe had a far greater understanding of its laws and nature?
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V)
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A reaction:
Another nice test of our intuitions, with which it is hard to disagree. This technique of argument is found in Plato's Republic (360e onwards). See also Aristotle Idea 543. There are some intuitions which you expect to be universal.
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5939
|
Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
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Full Idea:
The doctrine that morality is entirely social, that all duty consists in promoting the good of others, seems to me profound mistake; intellectual integrity, the love of truth for its own sake, is among the most salient elements in a good moral character.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI)
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A reaction:
The objection to this might be than an ideal love of truth is a social virtue, because it produces reliable and useful citizens. Would it be immoral for Robinson Crusoe to live by fictions, instead of facing the depressing truth?
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17947
|
Plato decided that the virtuous and happy life was the philosophical life [Plato, by Nehamas]
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Full Idea:
Plato came to the conclusion that virtue and happiness consist in the life of philosophy itself.
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|
From:
report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.117
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A reaction:
This view is obviously ridiculous, because it largely excludes almost the entire human race, which sees philosophy as a cul-de-sac, even if it is good. But virtue and happiness need some serious thought.
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5905
|
We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
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Full Idea:
On reflection it seems clear that pleasure is not the only thing in life that we think good in itself, that for instance we think the possession of a good character, or an intelligent understanding of the world, as good or better.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II)
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A reaction:
Aristotle and Plato would obviously agree with this. I agree, as I cannot comprehend the claim that pleasure is self-evidently the good, simply because it feels nice. Why shouldn't evil feel nice?
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5929
|
No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]
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|
Full Idea:
If anyone thinks pleasure alone is the good, it seems to me enough to ask whether, of two states of the universe holding equal amounts of pleasure, we should really think no better of one in with virtuous dispositions and actions than of its opposite.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V)
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A reaction:
An important technique of argument, analagous to scientific experiment. Hold the variable which is considered to be uniquely vital constant, and see if anyone cares if some other variable changes. It is a good argument.
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