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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics' and 'The Value of Science'

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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg]
     Full Idea: The emotivist gets things backwards: evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotions are types of evaluation.
     From: Deborah Achtenberg (Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics [2002], 6.1)
     A reaction: A nice comment, though a bit optimistic. It is certainly a valuable corrective to emotivist to pin down the cognitive and evaluative aspects of emotion, rather than regarding them as 'raw' feelings.