Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Prolegomena to Ethics' and 'Freedom and Reason'

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3 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The good life aims at perfections, or absolute laws, or what is absolutely desirable [Green,TH]
     Full Idea: The differentia of the good life …is controlled by the consciousness of there being some perfection which has to be fulfilled, some law which has to be obeyed, something absolutely desirable whatever the individual may for the time desire.
     From: T.H. Green (Prolegomena to Ethics [1882], p.134), quoted by John H. Muirhead - The Service of the State II
     A reaction: The 'perfection' suggests Plato, and the 'law' suggests Kant. The idea that something is 'absolutely desirable' is, I suspect, aimed at the utilitarians, who don't care what is desired. I'm no idealist, but have some sympathy with this idea.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
     Full Idea: According to Hare's universal prescriptivism, moral statements are closer to imperatives than to avowals of emotion; their purpose is to guide action. But unlike imeperatives they are universalisable.
     From: report of Richard M. Hare (Freedom and Reason [1963]) by Hans-Johann Glock - What is Analytic Philosophy? 2.9
     A reaction: Why isn't 'everyone ought to support West Ham' a moral judgement?
Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Hare has suggested that a fairly tight form of utilitarianism can be obtained from universalised prescriptivism.
     From: report of Richard M. Hare (Freedom and Reason [1963]) by Philippa Foot - Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake? p.191
     A reaction: All the benefits of Bentham, Kant and Hume, in one neat package! Since I take all three of them to be wrong about ethics, that counts against this idea.