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Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics' and 'Ethical consistency'

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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism

22453	Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
	Full Idea: Williams insisted that the feelings we have in situations of moral conflict show that the 'structure' of moral judgements is unlike that of assertions expressing beliefs.
	From: report of Bernard Williams (Ethical consistency [1965]) by Philippa Foot - Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma p.36
	A reaction: Foot presents this as a key reason for the non-cognitivist view of ethics, and her paper attacks it. I don't usually react to moral disagreement with the same vigour I have when I think a belief is untrue. It may just be uncertainty, though.