display all the ideas for this combination of texts
31 ideas
5911 | Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross] |
Full Idea: The moral order expressed in the propositions of duties is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe (or any possible universe) as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: A few of the axioms of geometry (e.g. the parallel line postulate) have been changed, with interesting results. Moral duties seem to change dramatically in a crisis, such as a war, or a ship sinking. Can I have a duty if I am too dim to perceive it? |
5926 | The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross] |
Full Idea: I cannot agree that a description of a patch of colour would be complete without the statement that it is beautiful (if that is so); for its beauty might be for some purposes the most important fact about it. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: 'Important' to whom. To me the most important fact about my pen might be that it is mine, but that doesn't seem to be a feature of an intrinsic description of the pen. If beauty is a relational quality, Ross's point is undermined. |
7259 | Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J] |
Full Idea: Ross held that moral principles are self-evident to us, meaning that no more is needed to reveal their truth to us as general guides to behaviour than what is the case before us, not that we can discover a moral truth just by thinking about it. | |
From: report of W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930]) by Jonathan Dancy - Intuitionism | |
A reaction: This seems to be a crucial distinction between two types of intuitionism, one that is purely a priori, and one that chimes in with the 'particularist' reading of virtue theory. The former is implausible and much attacked; the latter is more interesting. |
5913 | The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross] |
Full Idea: We have no more direct way of access to the facts about rightness and goodness and their objects, than by thinking about them; the moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just as perceptions are the data of science. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: Sounds suspiciously like 'the intuitions of people like me', and hence gets a bad name in late twentieth century super-democratic society (esp. in America), but personally I think you can only value education if you think educated people are superior. |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
Full Idea: There are convictions which are common to most societies; but there are others which are not, and no way is given by intuitionists of telling which are the authoritative data. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.454) | |
A reaction: It seems unfair on intuitionists to say they haven't given a way to evaluate such things, given that they have offered intuition. The issue is what exactly they mean by 'intuition'. |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
Full Idea: If it comes to deciding what intuitions and dispositions to cultivate, we cannot rely on the intuitions themselves, as intuitionists do. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.461) | |
A reaction: Makes intuitionists sound a bit dim. Surely Hume identifies dispositions (such as benevolence) which should be cultivated, because they self-evidently improve social life? |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
Full Idea: Emotivists concluded too hastily that because naturalism and intuitionism are false, you cannot reason about moral questions, because they assumed that the only questions you can reason about are factual ones. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.455) | |
A reaction: Personally I have a naturalistic view of ethics (based on successful functioning, as indicated by Aristotle), so not my prob. Why can't we reason about expressive emotions? We reason about art. |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
Full Idea: In any 'ought' statement there is implicit a principle which says that the statement applies to all precisely similar situations. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.456) | |
A reaction: No two situations can ever be 'precisely' similar. Indeed, 'precisely similar' may be an oxymoron (at least for situations). Kantians presumably like this idea. |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
Full Idea: Non-descriptivists (e.g. prescriptivists) reject descriptivism in its naturalist or intuitionist form, because they are both destined to collapse into relativism. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.453) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear from this why prescriptism would not also turn out to be relativist, if it includes evaluations along with facts. |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
Full Idea: Ethical descriptivism is the view that ethical sentence-meaning is wholly determined by truth-conditions. …Prescriptivists think there is a further element of meaning, which expresses prescriptions or evaluations or attitudes which we assent to. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.452) | |
A reaction: Not sure I understand either of these. If all meaning consists of truth-conditions, that will apply to ethics. If meaning includes evaluations, that will apply to non-ethics. |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
Full Idea: Prescriptivists claim that there are rules of reasoning which govern non-descriptive as well as descriptive speech acts. The standard example is possible logical inconsistency between contradictory prescriptions. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.455) | |
A reaction: The example doesn't seem very good. Inconsistency can appear in any area of thought, but that isn't enough to infer full 'rules of reasoning'. I could desire two incompatible crazy things. |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
Full Idea: Prescriptivists hold that moral judgements commit the speaker to motivations and actions, but non-moral facts by themselves do not do this. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.459) | |
A reaction: Surely hunger motivates to action? I suppose the key word is 'commit'. But lazy people are allowed to make moral judgements. |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
Full Idea: Universal prescriptivists hold that 'ought'-judgements are prescriptive like plain imperatives, but differ from them in being universalisable. | |
From: Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.457) | |
A reaction: Sounds a bit tautological. Which comes first, the normativity or the universalisability? |
5920 | Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross] |
Full Idea: For most theories of value may be divided into those which treat it as a quality and those which treat it as a relation between that which has value and something else, usually a state of mind. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: We might say that a leaf only has value to a tree (which has no mind). Presumably if value is a relation to a mind, it can be further reduced to being an object of desire, but this will give class A drugs a greater value than a beautiful deed. |
5923 | The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross] |
Full Idea: I conclude that the arguments in favour of thinking of value as an objective are no more successful than those in favour of treating it as a relation, ..and the natural view that value is a quality therefore holds its ground. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: See Ross's text for the arguments. It seems unlikely that argument could fully demonstrate his claim. Even physical qualities (such as weight or velocity) can have a relational component, and many things can only have value in a cultural context. |
5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross] |
Full Idea: By calling a thing intrinsically good we mean that it would be good even if nothing else existed. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: This dramatic image (the Mona Lisa alone in vacancy) raises grave doubts about whether there is very much that could qualify for 'intrinsic value'. I even doubt the value of the MS of the Goldberg Variations, if nothing else exists. |
5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross] |
Full Idea: Everyone would prefer the second of two universes, if each had equal vice and virtue, and each had equal pleasure and pain, but in the first the virtuous were miserable and the vicious happy, while in the second universe it was the opposite. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a very good example of an intuition which it is hard to resist. Would some vile Mafia boss really want heaven to be full of murderers, while good-hearted and kind people all went to hell? |
5922 | An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross] |
Full Idea: If a thing is only instrumentally good or bad, then even when its nature remains the same it might have a different instrumental value if the causal laws of the universe, or of other things in the universe, were different. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: A bad tin-opener might be instrumentally good if it was the only one you owned, so we don't need to change the causal laws of the universe. |
5921 | We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross] |
Full Idea: While it can be intelligently asked whether the pleasant or beautiful has value, it cannot be intelligently asked whether the good has value, since the good is just to be valuable. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: It is simply tautological that goodness has value, and that valuable things are good. But an assassin might 'value' a 'good' way of killing someone, or an instrument of torture. We might say "He values x, but x is bad". Still, he must think x is good. |
5932 | The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross] |
Full Idea: Four things seem to be intrinsically good - virtue, pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V) | |
A reaction: I greatly admire a philosopher who has the courage to assert such a thing, in the face of centuries of scepticism about anyone's ability to even get started in this area. We need the bold assertions first; we can work back to doubts later, if necessary. |
5910 | The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross] |
Full Idea: There are three main things which are intrinsically good - virtue, knowledge, and with certain limitations, pleasure. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: This combines the views of most of the main schools of ancient Greece. For Socrates, knowledge delivers the others; for Aristippus, pleasure eclipses the others; for Zeno of Citium, virtue is all that matters. Ross is a pluralist, like Aristotle. |
5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross] |
Full Idea: 'Right' does not mean the same as 'morally good'; we cannot substitute 'he is a right man' for 'he is a morally good man'; this is not just an English idiom, as it is clear that a 'right act' is the act which ought to be done. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I) | |
A reaction: This is nowadays accepted as a basic distinction in ethical discussions. Shooting a prisoner might be the right thing to do, but it is unlikely to be good. We may talk of 'good deeds', but never of 'right' people. |
5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross] |
Full Idea: If it is our duty to produce one or other of two or more different states of affairs, without its being our duty to produce one rather than the another, then in such a case each of these acts will be right, and none will be our duty. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I) | |
A reaction: An elegant piece of analytical philosophy, which shows fairly conclusively that 'right' is distinct from 'duty', as well as being distinct from 'good'. We can generalise about right actions, without identifying anyone who has the duty to perform them. |
5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross] |
Full Idea: In the past 'what is right' was hardly disentangled from 'what the tribe ordains'; ..'it is the custom' has been accompanied by 'the custom is right', or 'the custom is ordained by someone who has the right to command'. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I) | |
A reaction: Ross is rejecting this older view, in favour an absolute (and intuitively known) concept of what is right. All right-thinking people should wish Ross luck in his project, no matter how pessimistic the onlooker may be. |
5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross] |
Full Idea: Goodness in general runs out beyond the strict scope of ethics, if ethics be the philosophical study of good conduct; for some things that are good are neither conduct nor dispositions to conduct. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV) | |
A reaction: This seems to be right, just as the Greek term 'areté' extended beyond moral virtue to excellence in athletics or pottery. Maybe philosophers are too interested in ethics, and have thus missed the philosophical core of the problem. |
5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross] |
Full Idea: Actions are morally good in virtue of their motives; this is quite distinct from rightness, which belongs to act in virtue of the nature of what is done. So a good action may not do what is right, and a right action need not be morally good. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VII) | |
A reaction: This sounds neat, but it is hard to find clearcut examples to confirm it. Having your cat put down may be right but not good, but presumably your motive was good. |
5938 | Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross] |
Full Idea: The acquisition of pleasure for oneself rarely, if ever, presents itself as a duty, while the attainment of moral goodness habitually presents itself as a duty; this surely points to an infinity superiority of virtue over pleasure. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI) | |
A reaction: You have to be a fully paid-up intuitionist (like Ross) before you can assert such gloriously confident judgements about duty. Personal pleasure could become a duty if you had mistakenly denied it to yourself for a long time. |
5931 | All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross] |
Full Idea: Can anyone doubt that it would be a better state of the universe if, with equality in respect of virtue and of pleasure, and of the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, the persons in the universe had a far greater understanding of its laws and nature? | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V) | |
A reaction: Another nice test of our intuitions, with which it is hard to disagree. This technique of argument is found in Plato's Republic (360e onwards). See also Aristotle Idea 543. There are some intuitions which you expect to be universal. |
5939 | Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross] |
Full Idea: The doctrine that morality is entirely social, that all duty consists in promoting the good of others, seems to me profound mistake; intellectual integrity, the love of truth for its own sake, is among the most salient elements in a good moral character. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VI) | |
A reaction: The objection to this might be than an ideal love of truth is a social virtue, because it produces reliable and useful citizens. Would it be immoral for Robinson Crusoe to live by fictions, instead of facing the depressing truth? |
5905 | We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross] |
Full Idea: On reflection it seems clear that pleasure is not the only thing in life that we think good in itself, that for instance we think the possession of a good character, or an intelligent understanding of the world, as good or better. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II) | |
A reaction: Aristotle and Plato would obviously agree with this. I agree, as I cannot comprehend the claim that pleasure is self-evidently the good, simply because it feels nice. Why shouldn't evil feel nice? |
5929 | No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross] |
Full Idea: If anyone thinks pleasure alone is the good, it seems to me enough to ask whether, of two states of the universe holding equal amounts of pleasure, we should really think no better of one in with virtuous dispositions and actions than of its opposite. | |
From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V) | |
A reaction: An important technique of argument, analagous to scientific experiment. Hold the variable which is considered to be uniquely vital constant, and see if anyone cares if some other variable changes. It is a good argument. |