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Ideas for 'Introduction to Russell's Theory of Types', 'fragments/reports' and 'Leviathan'

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5 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2360 'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth 'Good'; and the object of his hate or aversion 'Evil'.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06)
     A reaction: This meets the Frege-Geach Problem - that we can have these feelings while reading ancient history, but we can't possibly 'desire' any of that. This is better on evil than on good.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
2368 Men's natural desires are no sin, and neither are their actions, until law makes it so [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: The desires and other passions of man are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions that proceed from those passions, till they know a law that forbids them.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.13)
     A reaction: That is a pretty flat rejection of natural law, as you might expect from an empiricist. So prior to the first law-making, no one ever did anything wrong? Hm.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
2359 Desire and love are the same, but in the desire the object is absent, and in love it is present [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Desire and love are the same thing, save that by desire we always signify the absence of the object, by love most commonly the presence of the same.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.06)
     A reaction: Implausible reductivism from Hobbes. Plenty of counterexamples to this. You work it out!
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
2370 All voluntary acts aim at some good for the doer [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], 1.14)
     A reaction: Nonsense. You can only describe sacrificial acts for loved ones, such as children, in this way if this proposal is a tautology. Hobbes cannot know the truth of this claim.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
1664 I would rather go mad than experience pleasure [Antisthenes (I)]
     Full Idea: I would rather go mad than experience pleasure.
     From: Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.3
     A reaction: Did he actually prefer pain? If both experiences would drive him mad, it seems like a desire for death. I cannot understand why anyone is opposed to harmless pleasures.