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Ideas for '', 'Treatise of Human Nature' and 'The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism'

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C]
     Full Idea: From our modern perspective, the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and moral insight lies irrecoverably shattered by the rise of natural science.
     From: report of David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §3.2
     A reaction: Modern attempts to challenge Hume's separation of fact from value have failed, but a return to the Greek perspective presents a plausible alternative.
The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume]
     Full Idea: Hume's objection to passing from 'is' to 'ought' would equally apply to passing from 'is' to 'owes' or from 'is' to 'needs'.
     From: comment on David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) by G.E.M. Anscombe - Modern Moral Philosophy p.176
     A reaction: Profound and important. The empirical and emotivist (nay, nihilist) clinging to the total independence of duties from facts crumbles when looking at facts of human nature or of social groups. Creatures ought to feed; societies ought to flourish.
You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume]
     Full Idea: In many writers I find that instead of the usual propositions 'is' and 'is not', I then find no proposition that is not connected with an 'ought' or an 'ought not'. It is necessary that a reason be given for how one can be a deduction from the other.
     From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], III.1.1)
     A reaction: A huge claim, the basis of the value-free modern scientific world view. Possible escapes are Greek virtue theory, or Kantian principles, or some sort of a priori values (as in Charles Taylor).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume]
     Full Idea: It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
     From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], II.III.ii)
     A reaction: A famous idea, and the embodiment of moral nihilism. I say nothing could ever refute someone who held such a view. No moral theory can force someone to care, if they just don't.