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Ideas for '', 'Symbolic Reasoning' and 'Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy'

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4 ideas

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: If there is a truth about the subject matter of ethics, why should it be simple? ..I shall argue that philosophy should not try to produce ethical theories.
     From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1)
     A reaction: Bizarrely defeatist - in parallel with Mysterians about the mind like McGinn. Is there any point in thinking at all? I suggest the aim of life as the best starting point.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: Intuitionism in ethics has been demolished by a succession of critics, and the ruins of it that remain above ground are not impressive enough to invite much history of what happened to it.
     From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: Why does intuitionism have such appeal to beginners in moral philosophy? There is a truth buried in it somewhere. See 'Sources of the Self' by Charles Taylor.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: The category of person is a poor foundation for ethical thought, because it looks like a sortal or classificatory notion while in fact it signals characteristics that almost all come in degrees (responsibility, self-reflection etc).
     From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: On the contrary, it must be the basis of moral theory, and its shifting character is strong support for Aristotle's approach to moral growth and responsibility.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: That "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" is intelligible brings out the basic weakness of prescriptive accounts of the evaluative.
     From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 7)
     A reaction: This might be an elision of two different prescriptions, mine and most people's. In what sense do I think the hotel good, as opposed to other people?