Combining Texts
Ideas for
'A Short History of Ethics', 'The Poverty of Philosophy' and 'The Human Condition'
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21 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
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19738
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Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
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20145
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Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
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20170
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Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
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20165
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Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes]
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20171
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Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes]
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20175
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If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
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8002
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Sophists don't distinguish a person outside one social order from someone outside all order [MacIntyre]
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20174
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Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
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20159
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Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
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20161
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The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
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20156
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We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
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20150
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There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
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20158
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Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
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8012
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The value/fact logical gulf is misleading, because social facts involve values [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
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20151
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Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
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20152
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Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
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20153
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Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
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20162
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Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
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8005
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'Happiness' is a bad translation of 'eudaimonia', which includes both behaving and faring well [MacIntyre]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
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20157
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Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes]
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20154
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Control is the key to well-being [Kekes]
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