Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Unconscious Cerebral Initiative', 'The World as Will and Idea' and 'Value Theory'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
21 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
|
21380
|
The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer]
|
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
|
21374
|
We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer]
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
|
18685
|
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
|
|
18666
|
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
|
|
18667
|
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
|
|
18679
|
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
|
|
18682
|
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
|
|
18683
|
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
|
|
18686
|
The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
|
18672
|
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
|
4181
|
Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer]
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
|
5649
|
Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton]
|
|
18677
|
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
|
18668
|
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
|
|
18670
|
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
|
|
18669
|
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
|
4177
|
Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer]
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
|
4185
|
Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer]
|
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
|
4183
|
Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer]
|
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
|
4172
|
Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer]
|
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
|
21371
|
We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer]
|