Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals' and 'Universal Prescriptivism'
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18 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
20838
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Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705
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How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
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2712
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You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
20813
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Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706
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Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2708
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An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
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2704
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If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
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2703
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Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
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2707
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If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
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2709
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Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
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2711
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Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
3045
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Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
20774
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Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
20864
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Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
5972
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Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
1777
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Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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5973
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Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
20845
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There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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