Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Against Liberalism' and 'Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari)'
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27 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
20838
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Fate initiates general causes, but individual wills and characters dictate what we do [Chrysippus]
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23096
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Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes]
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23095
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Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes]
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23087
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Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes]
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23089
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Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes]
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23093
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Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes]
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23098
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Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes]
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23094
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Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
20813
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Human purpose is to contemplate and imitate the cosmos [Chrysippus]
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20128
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Each person has a fixed constitution, which makes them a particular type of person [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
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22503
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Nietzsche could only revalue human values for a different species [Nietzsche, by Foot]
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23090
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Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
8041
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The superman is a monstrous oddity, not a serious idea [MacIntyre on Nietzsche]
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20135
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Nietzsche's higher type of man is much more important than the idealised 'superman' [Nietzsche, by Leiter]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / g. Will to power
20353
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The 'will to power' is basically applied to drives and forces, not to people [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
3045
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Stoics say justice is a part of nature, not just an invented principle [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
20774
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Only nature is available to guide action and virtue [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
20864
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Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
23117
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Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes]
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23119
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Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes]
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20113
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Friendly chats undermine my philosophy; wanting to be right at the expense of love is folly [Nietzsche]
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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / j. Evil
23088
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Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
5972
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Living happily is nothing but living virtuously [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
1777
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Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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5973
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Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23097
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What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes]
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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
20845
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There are shameful pleasures, and nothing shameful is good, so pleasure is not a good [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
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