Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Dthat', 'Emotivism' and 'Natural Goodness'
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11 ideas
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
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23686
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Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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23693
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Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
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23687
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Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
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2848
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Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
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2851
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Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
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2853
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Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
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2852
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Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
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2849
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Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
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2850
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How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]
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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
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22492
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Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
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22493
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Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
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